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Abstract 
 
Demand-side health policies, such as conditional cash transfers and public health 
insurance, aim to increase the utilization of healthcare services by providing financial 
incentives and higher purchasing power to under-served populations. With their 
increasing popularity in developing countries, there is a need for more research on their 
implementation and impact. In this dissertation, I examine demand-side health policies 
in India by evaluating the impact of these policies, identifying challenges in their 
implementation and proposing ways to improve their effectiveness in increasing the 
utilization of healthcare services. 
In the first chapter, I measure the impact of conditional cash transfers on health-seeking 
behaviors. I study the rollout of the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY or the 
motherhood support program), a conditional maternity benefits program implemented 
in 52 of India’s 640 districts in 2011. I estimate the effect of this program on three health-
seeking behaviors among pregnant women (at least one tetanus shot, at least one 
antenatal checkup and full immunization of child) by using a border discontinuity 
design. I compare the levels of health-seeking behaviors among births in villages along 
the borders of districts that received the program with those across the border in 
districts that did not receive the program. I do not find any large significant differences 
in health-seeking behaviors among births in districts that received the program.  
In the second chapter, I further examine the results from the first chapter by conducting 
a qualitative study to identify challenges in the implementation of conditional cash 
transfer programs aimed at improving maternal and child health in India. I interview 
147 beneficiaries and 24 administrators in four districts that received the program. 
These districts include one high, one medium and two low performing districts. Besides 
discussing the overall implementation of the program (levels of awareness, the 
application process and payment of benefits), I identify three themes that help explain 
the poor implementation of the program: high administrative burdens on beneficiaries, 
the reluctant role of street-level bureaucrats and low administrative capacity at the sub-
district level. 
In the third chapter, I propose a method to increase awareness about demand-side 
health programs to increase the utilization of healthcare services among intended 
beneficiaries. I design an intervention to increase levels of awareness about availing 
benefits under the Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY or the national health 
insurance program) among enrolled beneficiaries. I evaluate the effectiveness of village-
level awareness meetings in increasing utilization of program benefits by conducting an 
experiment in 61 villages of Chamarajanagara district in southern India. I find that 
village-level awareness meetings not only increase the utilization of health insurance 
benefits but also provide government agencies a unique opportunity to monitor 
program implementation in remote locations. 
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Introduction 
Demand-side interventions are becoming a popular policy tool to increase the 
utilization of healthcare in developing countries (Erlangga et al. 2019). After decades of 
public investments in supply-side interventions such as government-owned and 
operated healthcare services, governments are now moving to demand-side 
interventions such as health insurance and conditional cash transfers to increase 
utilization of healthcare (La Forgia and Nagpal 2012). Demand-side health interventions 
gained popularity in developing countries as concerns arose about the efficiency, 
fairness and quality of national health systems (Gupta et al. 2010). By providing 
intended beneficiaries with financial incentives and choice of provider (where possible), 
these interventions aim to increase utilization of healthcare services among under-
served populations. There is a growing literature that focuses on the effectiveness of 
demand-side health interventions in improving access to healthcare in developing 
countries (Ladhani and Sitter 2020; Erlangga et al. 2019; Gopalan et al. 2014; Glassman et 
al. 2013; Spaan et al. 2012; Rawlings and Rubio 2005). While most studies have focused 
on the impact of demand-side health interventions on the utilization of healthcare 
services, there is an increasing emphasis on studying the implementation of these 
policies (Hunter and Murray 2017). Public administration scholars have made a similar 
call for more direct engagement with beneficiaries of public programs to better 
understand ‘citizen-state interactions’ (Jakobsen et al. 2019). Others have called for more 
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research on public administration in developing countries (Bertelli et al. 2020). My 
dissertation contributes to this literature by focusing on the implementation of demand-
side health policies in India. 
India provides an interesting setting to study demand-side health interventions. While a 
public healthcare system that is owned and operated by the government still accounts 
for a majority of India’s healthcare budget, demand-side interventions are increasingly 
becoming popular. This is best exemplified by the proliferation of public health 
insurance and conditional cash transfer programs at the national and state levels. 
According to the annual reports of the Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority of India (IRDAI), the percentage of the population with health insurance 
coverage increased from 1 percent in 2005 to 27 percent in 2015 (IRDAI 2016). Of the 360 
million Indians who had any type of health insurance in 2015, 76 percent had 
subsidized health insurance provided by the government (IRDAI 2016). This large 
increase in health insurance coverage resulted from the introduction of the Rashtriya 
Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY, or the national health insurance program) in 2008. RSBY 
provides fully subsidized health insurance to all ‘below poverty line (BPL)’ households.  
Conditional cash transfer programs have also become popular as a demand-side 
intervention for increasing utilization of healthcare services, particularly among 
pregnant women. Both national and state governments have introduced new 
conditional cash transfer programs targeted at pregnant mothers over the past two 
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decades. Two of the most prominent programs include the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY 
or the Motherhood Protection Program) and the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana 
(IGMSY or the Indira Gandhi Motherhood Support Program) that were introduced in 
2005 and 2011, respectively. While the former incentivizes institutional births, the latter 
incentivizes health-seeking behaviors (such as antenatal checkups and immunization 
during pregnancy).  
As health insurance and conditional cash transfers become popular health policy 
interventions in India, it is important to study their effectiveness in improving access to 
healthcare. In this dissertation, I begin by evaluating the impact of a demand-side 
health policy. I then present results from a qualitative study that examines the 
challenges of implementing demand-side health policies. I conclude by proposing a 
method that addresses some of the challenges of implementing demand-side health 
policies. 
This dissertation consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, I examine whether 
conditional cash transfer programs can increase health-seeking behaviors among 
pregnant women. In the second chapter, I study the implementation of conditional cash 
transfer programs by interviewing administrators and beneficiaries of a national 
conditional maternity benefits program in four states of India. In the final chapter, I 
focus on the issue of low levels of awareness and its impact on the utilization of a 
national public health insurance program among hard-to-reach populations. This 
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dissertation uses mixed methods to study the effectiveness of demand-side health 
policies in India. The first chapter uses a border discontinuity design to estimate the 
impact of a conditional maternity benefits program on health-seeking behaviors. The 
second chapter uses data from qualitative interviews to identify issues in the 
implementation of a national conditional maternity benefits program. The third chapter, 
co-authored with Changqing Sun, uses a quasi-experiment to test the effectiveness of an 
information, education and communication (IEC) intervention in increasing the 
utilization of a public health insurance program.  
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Chapter I: Can Conditional Cash Transfers Increase Health-seeking 
Behaviors among Pregnant Women? Evidence from India 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past three decades, there has been a proliferation of conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) programs in developing countries (Bastagli et al. 2016; Fiszbein and Schady 2009). 
CCT programs became popular in the 1990s following the macroeconomic crisis in Latin 
American countries that led to a decline in the utilization of health and education 
services (UNDP 2009). Governments in the region responded by providing cash to low-
income households if they fulfilled certain conditions like using healthcare services or 
enrolling children in schools. With the success of CCT programs such as Oportunidades 
in Mexico (Parker and Todd 2017) and Bolsa Familia in Brazil (Glewwe and Kassouf 
2012) in the early 2000s, there was a push for other developing countries to use similar 
interventions for improving uptake of social services (UNDP 2009).  
Three decades later, CCT programs have become an important policy intervention for 
improving maternal and child health in developing countries (Glassman et al. 2013; 
Ranganathan and Lagarde 2012). This is particularly true for India where the national 
government along with many state governments have introduced CCT programs to 
increase the demand for maternal and child health services. After years of investments 
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in supply-side interventions such as building new childcare centers and healthcare 
facilities, governments are now introducing demand-side interventions that incentivize 
citizens to use these services. The two most prominent CCT programs for maternal and 
child health introduced at the national level are the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY or the 
motherhood protection program) in 2005 and the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana 
(IGMSY or the motherhood support program) in 2011. While the former incentivizes 
institutional deliveries by providing a cash benefit to pregnant women who deliver in a 
public healthcare facility, the latter aims to increase health-seeking behaviors among 
pregnant women before and after their delivery. Similar CCT programs are also 
becoming popular at the state-level as some states such as Tamil Nadu and Odisha have 
introduced their CCT programs. As CCT programs gain popularity, it is important to 
study their effectiveness in improving maternal and child health.  
Most literature on maternal and child health CCT programs in India focuses on JSY, the 
institutional delivery CCT program. Other than a few descriptive studies, there is very 
limited evidence on the effectiveness of IGMSY, the health-seeking behavior CCT 
program. In this paper, I address this gap in the literature by providing the first causal 
estimates of the effectiveness of IGMSY in increasing health-seeking behaviors among 
pregnant women. I do so by studying the rollout of IGMSY in 52 of India’s 640 districts 
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in 2011. The program was subsequently renamed and scaled up to all districts1 in 2016. I 
use a border discontinuity design to compare health-seeking behaviors for births in 
areas within the borders of districts that were eligible for IGMSY benefits (treatment) 
with those across the border in non-IGMSY districts (control). I do not find any large 
statistically significant differences in health-seeking behaviors among births in 
treatment and control areas. I further investigate these results by conducting interviews 
with program beneficiaries and administrators in four IGMSY districts to identify 
possible explanations for the program’s limited effect on health-seeking behaviors. 
These findings are presented in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
In the following section, I discuss the literature on maternal and child health CCT 
programs in India and describe IGMSY. I then detail the data and methodology used to 
conduct my analysis. I present results in the fourth section and conclude with a 
discussion of my results in the fifth section.  
 
2. Maternal and Child Health CCT Programs in India 
Since the early 2000s, the government of India has introduced two national CCT 
programs that aim to improve maternal and child health outcomes. The first program, 
 
1 The program was renamed Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY) and scaled up to all 640 districts. 
Unlike IGMSY, which provides benefits for the first two births, PMMVY limits benefits to the first child only. 
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Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY or the motherhood protection program) was introduced by 
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) in 2005 to reduce maternal 
mortality by increasing institutional deliveries. In 2011, the Ministry of Women and 
Child Development (MoWCD) rolled out the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana 
(IGMSY or the motherhood support program) to increase health-seeking behaviors 
among pregnant women before and after their delivery. Some states have their 
conditional maternity benefits programs such as the Dr. Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity 
Benefits (DMRMB) program in Tamil Nadu, a state in southern India, and the Mamata 
program in Odisha, a state in eastern India. They were introduced in 2006 and 2011, 
respectively. Existing studies on maternal and child health CCT programs in India have 
primarily consisted of process evaluations (UNFPA 2009; Sinha et al. 2016; NITI Aayog 
2017). While there have been attempts to estimate the causal impact of maternal and 
child health CCT programs, these have faced numerous challenges. One of the major 
challenges of estimating the causal impact of these programs in India is the 
simultaneous introduction of programs across the country or in individual states. This 
limits the options for identifying possible control groups for estimating the program’s 
impact. A second challenge is the limited availability of data. There are two major 
sources of nationally representative cross-sectional maternal and child health data in 
India: District Level Health Surveys (DLHS) and National Family Health Surveys 
(NFHS). As JSY was rolled out in 2005, data from the second (2002-04) and third (2007-
11 
 
08) rounds of DLHS2 provide an ideal opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the 
program. This explains why most studies on maternal and child health CCT programs 
in India focus on JSY (Lim et al. 2010; Powell-Jackson et al. 2011; Dongre and Kapur 
2012; Sareen and Sivaram 2014). Lim et al. (2010) use data from the second (2002-04) and 
third (2007-08) rounds of DLHS to estimate the impact of CCT programs on institutional 
births and antenatal care. They find that the program led to a large increase in 
institutional births but a modest increase in antenatal care visits. Their main 
specification uses individual-level matching to compare births that received maternity 
benefits with those that did not. This raises concerns about the likelihood of selection 
bias as mothers receiving the benefit are more likely to have institutional births. They 
also find a reduction in perinatal and neonatal deaths due to the program. Powell-
Jackson et al. (2011) use the same datasets but employ a different methodology to 
estimate the impact of financial incentives for institutional births. They find that the 
program was associated with a significant increase in the percentage of institutional 
births. However, they find that the program did not have any effect on the utilization of 
antenatal care services or neonatal mortality. Powell-Jackson et al. (2011) argue that their 
estimates are more credible because their study addresses the selection bias problem by 
 
2 For more detailed information about various rounds of DLHS and NFHS, see Table 2. 
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comparing districts that had high program coverage with districts that had low 
coverage (some districts received the program earlier than others). 
Sareen and Sivaram (2014) provide a comprehensive summary of the studies and 
identify the use of self-reported measures of receiving program benefits as a major 
limitation. By focusing on individuals and districts that received the program (and 
comparing them to those that did not), the authors increase the likelihood of selection 
bias. Sareen and Sivaram (2014) address this concern by using changes in eligibility 
criteria during the first year of JSY rollout to identify the impact of the program on 
prenatal care, institutional deliveries and postnatal care. They find “modest effects” of 
the program on institutional deliveries and no effect on prenatal care and postnatal 
care. As is evident from the discussion above, it is unclear whether JSY caused large or 
modest increases in institutional deliveries. As JSY was implemented at the same time 
as the National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), an initiative by the government to 
increase investment in rural health infrastructure, the large increase in institutional 
deliveries since 2005 can also be attributed to NRHM. 
In the late 2000s, the government of India shifted its focus on health-seeking behaviors 
before and after delivery. In 2011, the MoWCD rolled out IGMSY in 52 of India’s 640 
districts with at least one district in each of India’s 36 states and union territories. 
Simultaneously, the Government of Odisha introduced a similar program called 
Mamata (‘motherhood’ in Oriya, the state language) in all districts of Odisha. Though 
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there are no quantitative studies that analyze the impact of IGMSY, Raghunathan et al. 
(2017) use cross-sectional household survey data to estimate the impact of Mamata. They 
use nearest-neighbor matching and inverse probability weighting models to estimate 
the effect of the program on eight outcomes that include antenatal care visits and full 
immunization. They find that the program increased the likelihood of receiving 
antenatal care visits by six percentage points and full immunization of a child by 10 
percentage points when using the nearest neighbor matching identification strategy 
(Raghunathan et al. 2017). 
This paper aims to contribute to this growing literature on maternal and child health 
CCT programs by studying the rollout of IGMSY to evaluate the impact of financial 
incentives on health-seeking behaviors before and after delivery. This paper presents 
the first causal estimates of the effect of this program and is the first study to use a 
border discontinuity design to study maternal and child health policies in India. 
 
3. Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY) 
In 2011, the government of India rolled out IGMSY to provide all pregnant women a 
cash benefit of ₹4,0003 ($54) for their first two live births. The program had three 
 
3 ₹4,000 is approximately 10 percent of the average annual household income in India according to the Indian 
Human Development Survey – Round 2 (IHDS 2012). 
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objectives: first, to provide pregnant women partial wage compensation so they can rest 
before and after their delivery; second, to provide pregnant women access to better 
health and nutrition through additional income; and third, to promote health-seeking 
behaviors by incentivizing the use of maternal and child health services such as 
antenatal care visits and child immunization. All women aged 19 years and above are 
eligible to receive the cash benefit in three installments once they fulfill a set of 
conditions. Table 1 lists details about each installment. 
Once a woman is pregnant, she must register her pregnancy with her local childcare 
center. The MoWCD runs 1.3 million childcare centers4 across the country. Each 
childcare center (also known as an Anganwadi which translates to a courtyard in Hindi) 
is managed by a childcare worker, who is assisted by a childcare helper. The childcare 
worker is responsible for conducting non-formal pre-school activities for the children, 
record-keeping (monitoring the health of all pregnant women and children), counseling 
pregnant women and new mothers, managing the supplementary nutrition program, 
assisting health workers in immunization drives and undertaking a survey of all 
households in the village. The childcare helper cooks the food and cleans the center.  
The childcare worker is responsible for implementing IGMSY by informing eligible 
beneficiaries about the program and submitting applications for each installment on 
 
4 Childcare centers are run under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS). As per ICDS program 
guidelines, there should be a childcare center for every 300 individuals. 
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their behalf. All pregnant women receive a Mother and Child Protection (MCP) card 
when they register for their pregnancy at the childcare center. The MCP card helps 
childcare workers keep track of the mother and child’s health indicators (such as 
weight, height and immunizations). Once the mother has met all the conditions of an 
installment, the childcare worker applies for the benefit on their behalf. For each 
installment, the mother must submit a copy of her MCP, bank passbook and Unique 
Identification (UID or Aadhaar) card to the childcare worker. The childcare worker 
submits this application to her supervisor5 who submits it to the block child 
development office. The block office then sends the information to the district office 
which uploads it on the IGMSY software to inform the MoWCD of the beneficiary’s 
claim. Payments are made directly to the beneficiary’s bank account. 
The program was implemented in 52 of India’s 640 districts. These districts were 
selected using a composite score developed by the MoWCD. The composite score was 
created by adding six maternal and child health indicators from the third round (2007-
08) of DLHS. These indicators include literate female population, pregnancy registered 
in the first trimester, received at least three antenatal checkups (ANCs) during last 
pregnancy, institutional births, children aged 12-23 months who are fully immunized 
(BCG, three doses each of DPT, Polio and Measles) and children breastfed within one 
 
5 Each district is divided into blocks and each block has a block child development office. Each block child 
development office has supervisors who are responsible for supervising groups of childcare centers. 
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hour of birth. As all six indicators are percentages, the maximum score possible is 600. 
According to IGMSY program guidelines, the MoWCD selected a mix of high, medium 
and low performing districts to learn lessons from program implementation in different 
types of districts before scaling it up to the rest of the country (MoWCD 2011). Of the 52 
districts, 11 were high performing, 26 were medium performing, 11 were low 
performing and 4 were union territories6 (UTs). Districts were selected to ensure that at 
least one district was selected from each of India’s 36 states and UTs. Figure 4 shows the 
location of these districts. 
Unlike JSY, which was implemented simultaneously across the country, IGMSY was 
only rolled out in 52 of India’s 640 districts. This provides an ideal opportunity to study 
the effectiveness of maternal and child health conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs 
in India. One of the major concerns while identifying the causal impact of any program 
is the lack of good control groups. In the case of IGMSY, there are many potential 
control groups as the program was not only implemented across the country but also 
across different types of districts based on performance (i.e. high, medium and low 
performing districts). In the following section, I discuss the availability of data and the 
method I use to estimate the causal impact of IGMSY.  
 
6 Union territories (UTs) are a type of administrative division in India. Unlike states, UTs do not have their own 
government but are administered directly by the central government. A district from each UT was selected for 
IGMSY implementation (these districts were not selected based on the composite score). 
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4. Data and Methods 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are two major sources of data on maternal 
and child health in India: National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) and District Level 
Health Surveys (DLHS). While the former is part of USAID’s Demographic Health 
Surveys (DHS), the latter is conducted by the MoHFW. Table 2 provides an overview of 
these surveys. 
Ideally, these surveys could be combined to create a pooled cross-section dataset and 
used for estimating the impact of the maternal and child health conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program by comparing IGMSY districts with non-IGMSY districts over 
time. However, due to multiple reasons, it is not feasible to pool these surveys for this 
analysis. First, over the past two decades, many new districts have been created. IGMSY 
districts were selected using information from the census of 2011 (only NFHS-4 uses 
this set of districts). Second, while DLHS and NFHS have similar questionnaires, the 
method of coding responses differs for questions related to immunizations and 
antenatal checkups. Third, while it is possible to use only the NFHS surveys (to avoid 
the issue of the coding of responses), the first three rounds of NFHS do not have large 
enough sample sizes for conducting a district-level analysis. More importantly, the 
third round (2005-06) of NFHS does not have a district identifier as this was the first 
18 
 
time USAID was using the HIV questionnaire (which has more stringent requirements 
of anonymity).  
Keeping these limitations in mind, I use cross-sectional data from NFHS-4 for this 
study. NFHS-4 has two distinct advantages: first, unlike its predecessors, it has very 
large sample sizes to allow for district-level analysis and second, it is the first nationally 
representative maternal and child health survey in India to provide Geographic 
Information System (GIS) data. 
 
Border Discontinuity Design 
I use a border discontinuity design to estimate the effect of financial incentives on 
health-seeking behaviors. A border discontinuity design relies on the assumption that 
people living along borders are similar and if one side of the border receives a 
treatment, those on the other side can be considered a possible control group for 
estimation of treatment effects. 
As IGMSY districts are spread across the country, I use non-IGMSY districts bordering 
the IGMSY districts as a control group. While it is possible to use an entire bordering 
district as a control group for an IGMSY district, I limit my analysis to buffers on either 
side of the border of IGMSY districts. I do this as some small districts are bordered by 
large districts and vice-versa which reduces the plausibility of the identifying 
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assumption that bordering districts are comparable. I create 15km buffers along the 
borders of all IGMSY districts to identify treatment and control groups for my analysis. 
Figure 2 illustrates this using a snapshot from ArcGIS. 
All births in villages located7 in the highlighted area inside the IGMSY district border 
(red buffer) are in the treatment group while births in villages located in the highlighted 
area outside the IGMSY district border (green buffer), in the non-IGMSY districts, are in 
the control group. I do not include births in villages along state borders (as shown in the 
highlighted district) to avoid comparing births across states. States often have state-
level programs that could affect health outcomes. I also drop IGMSY districts that are 
predominantly urban as I focus exclusively on rural areas because bordering areas8 of 
districts are primarily rural which makes it difficult to find similar control groups for 
urban districts. I limit my analytic sample to first and second order births based on the 
program’s eligibility criteria.  
A border discontinuity design relies on two assumptions: first, in the absence of 
treatment, the outcomes would be similar along the borders (i.e. births in villages on 
both sides of the district border would have similar levels of health-seeking behaviors) 
 
7 To ensure respondent confidentiality, the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) program responsible for conducting 
the National Family Health Surveys, randomly displaces the GPS locations of all primary sampling units (PSUs). 
For rural clusters, there is a positional error ranging from 0 to 5 kilometers, with a further 1% of clusters displaced 
by 0 to 10 kilometers. 
8 Each district is centered around a city which serves as the district’s headquarters. 
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and second, there are no spillovers. Ideally, the first assumption can be tested by 
studying the pre-trends in the variable of interest. In this case, it is impossible to study 
pre-trends as there is no GIS data available for the previous rounds of NFHS to create 
similar buffers along district borders. Given this limitation, I use two alternative 
methods to assess the robustness of my empirical approach. First, I compare the 
observable socio-economic characteristics associated with births in the control and 
treatment areas. As observed in Table 3, births in control and treatment areas are similar 
across all observable socio-economic indicators other than household size. The 
difference in household size for births in control and treatment areas is small (0.2) and 
only marginally significant at 10 percent. 
A second approach to test the main assumption of a border discontinuity design is to 
use placebo tests. By randomly assigning treatment to districts that did not receive the 
program, I can check whether there are significant differences in outcomes between 
births in control and treatment areas. Results from the placebo test are presented in 
Table A in the appendix.  
Another important concern when using a border discontinuity design is the possibility 
of spillovers. If pregnant women from non-IGMSY districts were traveling to childcare 
centers in IGMSY districts and receiving benefits, there would be a concern with 
spillovers of IGMSY benefits to non-IGMSY districts. As pregnant women are required 
to submit their UID cards as proof of address, the possibility of spillovers is negligible. 
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Empirical Model 
I use the following linear probability model9 to estimate the effect of a maternal and 
child health CCT program (IGMSY) on health-seeking behaviors for first and second 
births: 
𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑗 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑 +  𝜷𝟐𝑿𝒊 + 𝜏𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑑𝑗 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑑𝑗 is the binary outcome measure for birth i in district d in border-quadrant 
area j (area j includes control and treatment villages along the border of each quadrant10 
of the IGMSY district). The three outcome variables of interest in this study are (1) at 
least one tetanus shot during pregnancy, (2) at least one antenatal care visit during 
pregnancy and (3) full immunization of children aged one year and above. I focus on 
these three health-seeking behaviors as these are the IGMSY conditions for which data 
is available. Information about other IGMSY conditions such as exclusive breastfeeding, 
counseling sessions and weighing of infants are either unavailable or include a high 
number of non-responses. I cluster standard errors at the district-level. 
The variable 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑑 is coded 1 for all births in IGMSY districts and 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient of the treatment variable (𝛽1) estimates the treatment effect (i.e. the difference 
 
9 I run logit regressions to check for the robustness of my results from the linear probability model. 
10 I divide each IGMSY district into quadrants and assign a fixed effect to areas (control and treatment) along each 
of the four segments of the district’s border. 
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in health-seeking behaviors between births in areas that received the program and 
births in areas that did not). This model estimates the intent-to-treat effect as it 
considers all first and second births in IGMSY districts as treated. As NFHS data does 
not include questions about IGMSY, it is impossible to know whether a respondent 
received program benefits. 
The model also includes a vector of individual and household-level control variables. 
As program uptake may differ based on individual and household-level differences, it 
is important to control for these characteristics. The model controls for the individual 
(child’s age, child’s sex, mother’s age, mother’s education, birth order and year) and 
household (household size, religion, caste and wealth quintile) characteristics. Finally, 
the model includes district border-quadrant fixed effects which improve the 
identification of the effect of the program by controlling for common factors in the 
control and treatment areas along the border of each quadrant of the IGMSY district. I 
divide each IGMSY district into quadrants and assign each segment a fixed effect. By 
adding border-quadrant fixed effects to the model, I am essentially comparing births 
along the border of each quadrant of the IGMSY district with births across this border in 
non-IGMSY districts. 
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5. Results 
Table 4 presents the results of estimating the model for all districts. The estimated 
treatment effect (𝛽1) is close to zero and not statistically significant for tetanus shots and 
antenatal checkups. The effect of the program on full immunization of children aged 
one year and above is 3.3 percentage points and this is statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. This is a relatively small effect compared to other studies which find 
effects as large as 10 percentage points for similar programs (Raghunathan et al. 2017). 
Given the sufficient sample size, my general finding of no effects when I include all 
districts in the model is consistent with either true zero effects or masked district-level 
heterogeneity. 
To determine whether these results are masking heterogeneous treatment effects, I 
estimate the model separately for high, medium and low performing IGMSY districts 
and the corresponding bordering control areas. This classification is based on the 
composite score developed by MoWCD. Table 5 presents results from estimating the 
model for high, medium and low performing districts. For the first outcome (at least 
one tetanus shot during pregnancy), I do not find any statistically significant differences 
between births in treatment and control areas. The estimates of treatment effect are 
close to zero. The only exception is seen with medium performing districts where I find 
a treatment effect of 2.2 percentage. However, this is only statistically significant at the 
10 percent level. 
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For the second outcome (at least one antenatal checkup), I find a treatment effect of 2.8 
percentage points for high-performing districts that is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The estimate of the treatment effect for medium performing districts is 2.4 
percent but this is not statistically significant from zero. The estimate for the low 
performing districts is close to zero.  
For the third outcome (full immunization of children at least 1-year-old), the estimate 
for the treatment effect for high-performing districts is close to zero. The estimates for 
medium and low performing districts are 4.4 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. 
Both estimates are not statistically significant. 
I run three checks to test the robustness of my results. In the first robustness check, I 
reduce the size of the buffer from 15km to 10km, hence limiting the sample to births 
taking place within 10km of IGMSY districts’ borders. This check is commonly used to 
test the robustness of results when using a border discontinuity design. I find that the 
results (see Table B in the appendix) are similar to those in Table 4. In the second check, 
I restrict my sample to villages that have at least one control or treatment village within 
a 15 km radius. By doing this, I ensure that every village has at least one corresponding 
control or treatment village. Once again, the results (see Table C in the appendix) are 
similar to those in Table 4. 
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As seen in Table 4 and Table 5, I do not observe any large statistically significant 
differences in health-seeking behaviors among births along the borders of IGMSY 
districts. A potential explanation for these results could be issues related to program 
implementation. While government documents show large allocations of funds to the 
program between 2011 and 2016 (Sinha et al. 2016), it is unclear whether the program 
had high coverage as the fourth round of NFHS (the only national health survey 
conducted since 2011) did not include any questions on IGMSY. Finally, the lack of any 
impact of the maternal and child health CCT program could be a result of problems 
with program design such as the size of the cash transfer or the method of delivery. To 
better understand these results, I interviewed program beneficiaries and administrators 
in four IGMSY districts. Findings from these interviews are presented in the second 
chapter of my dissertation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Demand-side interventions such as conditional cash transfers (CCT) are becoming a 
popular policy intervention for improving maternal and child health in India. Over the 
past two decades, national and state governments in India have introduced multiple 
maternal and child health CCT programs to increase the utilization of maternal and 
child health services. Two of the prominent maternal and child health CCT programs in 
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India are the Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY), an institutional delivery CCT program rolled 
out in 2005, and the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY), a health-seeking 
behavior CCT program introduced in 2011. Existing evidence on maternal and child 
health CCT programs in India primarily focuses on the institutional delivery CCT 
program, with a few studies on health-seeking behavior CCT programs. This paper 
aims to address this gap in the literature by presenting the first causal estimates of the 
impact of IGMSY on health-seeking behaviors among pregnant women in India. 
I use a border discontinuity design to estimate the impact of maternal and child health 
CCT programs by comparing the levels of health-seeking behaviors among births 
taking place along the borders of districts that received IGMSY with births taking place 
across the border in districts that did not receive IGMSY. I focus on three health-seeking 
behaviors: receiving at least one tetanus shot during pregnancy, receiving at least one 
antenatal checkup during pregnancy and full immunization of children aged 1 and 
above. I do not find any large significant differences in health-seeking behaviors among 
births along the borders of IGMSY districts. 
Glewwe and Muralidharan (2015) present several possible interpretations of statistically 
insignificant zero results in program evaluations. First, poor implementation resulting 
from corruption and administrative failures which the authors describe as a “binding 
constraint in many developing countries.” Second, the program does not work for most 
participants but works for some. Finally, the absence of complementary resources 
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needed for the effective implementation of the program. They conclude that a “black 
box” program evaluation may provide limited insights about the program. Instead, 
more data needs to be collected about the intermediate processes.  
One of the major limitations of studying a program like IGMSY is the limited 
availability of data about the program and its beneficiaries. A good illustration of this is 
the absence of any questions about IGMSY in the most important government-funded 
national maternal and child health survey. To further examine my quantitative results, I 
interviewed program administrators and beneficiaries in four of the 52 IGMSY districts 
(one high, one medium and two low performing districts). Findings from these 
interviews are discussed in the second chapter of this dissertation. 
Ideally, studying the effects of the program using longitudinal data would improve the 
internal validity of the study. As discussed in the paper, due to the limited availability 
of data, I conduct my analysis using cross-sectional data. As I use a village-level border 
discontinuity design, the external generalizability of the results is limited to rural areas 
along the borders of IGMSY districts. In the future, I hope to address both these 
concerns by studying the expansion of IGMSY to all 640 districts of India in 2016. 
Unlike IGMSY, the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY or the Prime 
Minister Motherhood Program) only covers first-order births (MoWCD 2017). This 
policy change, along with data expected from the fifth round (2018-19) of NFHS, 
provides an ideal opportunity to use a difference-in-differences design to estimate the 
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impact of maternal and child health CCT programs on health-seeking behaviors and 
other health outcomes in India. 
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7. Tables and Figures 
Table 1: IGMSY Conditions and Payments 
Installment Payment Conditions 
First 
(end of 2nd 
trimester) 
₹1500 
(US $21) 
Pregnancy registered within four months 
Received at least one antenatal checkup (ANC) 
Received Iron and Folic Acid (IFA) tablets 
Received at least one tetanus vaccination 
Received at least one counseling session 
Second 
(child is 
three 
months old) 
₹1500 
(US $21) 
Childbirth is registered 
Child received first round of vaccinations (Polio, BCG, DPT-1 and DPT-2) 
Child has been weighed at least two times after birth 
Mother has attended at least two counseling sessions 
Third 
(child is six 
months old) 
₹1000 
(US $14) 
Child has been exclusively breastfed for six months (self-reported) 
Child has been introduced to complementary foods in seventh month (self-reported) 
Child receives second round of vaccinations (Polio and DPT-3) 
Child has been weighed at least two times between three months and six months of 
age  
Source: MoWCD (2011) 
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Figure 1: IGMSY Districts 
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Table 2: Summary of NFHS and DLHS 
Survey Year Districts Covered 
(Total Districts) 
Sample 
Size 
Notes 
NFHS-1 1992-93 – 88,562  
NFHS-2 1998-99 – 91,196  
DLHS-1 1998-99 504 (504) 529,817  
DLHS-2 2002-04 593 (593) 620,107  
NFHS-3 2005-06 – 109,041 No district identifier 
DLHS-3 2007-08 601 (612) 720,320 Nagaland State excluded 
DLHS-4 2012-13 336 (620) 350,000 Low-income states 
excluded 
NFHS-4 2015-16 640 (640) 568,200 Includes GIS data 
NFHS-5 2018-19 – – Data collection ongoing 
Source: Compiled by author from primary data and Dandona et al. (2016) 
 
Figure 2: Border Discontinuity Design using NFHS-4 GIS Data 
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Table 3: Comparison of Treatment and Control Groups 
Covariates Control Treatment Difference (p-value) 
Mother's Age (Years) 24.9 25.1 0.1 (0.18) 
Mother's Education (Years) 6.7 6.8 0.1 (0.59) 
Child's Age (Years) 1.9 1.9 0.0 (0.94) 
Household Size (No. of Members) 6.3 6.1 -0.2 (0.09) 
Girl Child 48.4 48.2 -0.2 (0.84) 
First Child 53.3 53.2 -0.2 (0.86) 
Wealth Quintile (Poorest) 28.4 29.1 0.7 (0.60) 
Wealth Quintile (Poorer) 25.1 23.6 -1.5 (0.21) 
Wealth Quintile (Middle) 21.4 22.2 0.8 (0.45) 
Wealth Quintile (Richer) 16.7 17.0 0.4 (0.75) 
Wealth Quintile (Richest) 8.5 8.1 -0.5 (0.58) 
Hindu 82.7 81.8 -1.0 (0.41) 
Muslim 11.3 11.6 0.3 (0.79) 
Scheduled Castes 22.1 23.1 1.0 (0.46) 
Indigenous Tribes 12.6 12.4 -0.2 (0.85) 
Total Observations (N) 6412 3836 
 
Calculated by the author using border-quadrant fixed effects. 
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Table 4: Results (All Districts) 
Dependent Variable 
At least 1 Tetanus 
Shot 
At least 1 Antenatal 
Checkup 
Full Immunization 
if > 1 year 
Treated District 
0.003 0.012 0.033* 
-0.008 -0.012 -0.02 
    
Mean (Control) 94.5 83.9 57 
Border-Quadrants 110 110 110 
Observations 7090 7136 7881 
R-squared 0.133 0.21 0.169 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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Table 5: Results (By Performance Type) 
Dependent 
Variable 
At least 1 Tetanus Shot At least 1 Antenatal Checkup Full Immunization if > 1 year 
District Type High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Treatment 
District 
-0.01 0.022* -0.007 0.028*** 0.024 -0.008 0.01 0.044 0.033 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.01) (0.019) (0.025) (0.03) (0.033) (0.032) 
          
Mean (Controls) 93.3 95.1 94.6 96 91 72.1 77.8 60.5 45.6 
Border-
Quadrants 
30 48 32 30 48 32 30 48 32 
Observations 1391 3082 2617 1387 3132 2617 1483 3335 3063 
R-squared 0.322 0.049 0.031 0.032 0.108 0.154 0.115 0.191 0.06 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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8. Appendix 
To test the main assumption of a border discontinuity design, I run a placebo test. I 
assign treatment status to non-IGMSY districts (that do not have any IGMSY district 
bordering them). I run the same analysis for these districts and find no significant 
positive effects of the treatment. The coefficients (treatment effect) are close to zero. 
Table A: Placebo Test (Assigned treatment to untreated districts) 
Dependent 
Variable 
At least 1 Tetanus 
Shot 
At least 1 Antenatal 
Checkup 
Full Immunization if > 1 
year 
Treatment 
District 
-0.006 -0.004 0.014 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.016) 
    
Mean (Controls) 88.2 95.6 57.1 
Border-
Quadrants 
122 122 122 
Observations 8,347 8,351 9,374 
R-squared 0.133 0.126 0.189 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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Table B: Robustness Check (Reduced buffers from 15km to 10 km) 
Dependent 
Variable 
At least 1 Tetanus 
Shot 
At least 1 Antenatal 
Checkup 
Full Immunization if > 1 
year 
Treatment 
District 
0.008 0.005 0.028 
(0.01) (0.012) (0.019) 
    
Mean (Controls) 94.6 85 57.7 
Border-
Quadrants 
109 109 109 
Observations 4991 5034 5564 
R-squared 0.11 0.226 0.188 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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Table C: Results (Only villages with control/treatment villages within a 15km radius) 
Dependent 
Variable 
At least 1 Tetanus 
Shot 
At least 1 Antenatal 
Checkup 
Full Immunization if 
> 1 year 
Treatment 
District 
0.007 0.012 0.032 
-0.007 -0.013 -0.02 
    
Mean (Controls) 94.5 83.2 56.6 
Border-
Quadrants 
108 108 108 
Observations 6739 6786 7524 
R-squared 0.054 0.207 0.167 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
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Chapter II: Successful Delivery? Identifying Challenges in the 
Implementation of Conditional Maternity Benefits in India 
 
1. Introduction 
As demand-side interventions become a popular policy tool for governments in 
developing countries, there is growing concern over their effectiveness in improving 
access to healthcare services (Ladhani and Sitter 2020; Erlannga et al. 2019; Spaan et al. 
2012). Two important concerns are the availability of good quality healthcare services 
(i.e. supply-side constraints) and the ability of governments to implement these 
programs (i.e. administrative capacity). The literature on demand-side health policies in 
developing countries has primarily focused on the former while the latter has received 
limited attention (Hunter and Murray 2017; Peters et al. 2013). As demand-side 
interventions replace more conventional supply-side health interventions that rely on 
direct provisioning of healthcare by governments, there is a need to examine the 
challenges of implementing such policies. This is particularly true for rural areas in 
developing countries that have underdeveloped markets for healthcare services, limited 
banking services and inadequate administrative capacity to monitor and supervise 
social programs. 
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A similar concern has been raised by public administration researchers who have called 
for more direct engagement with beneficiaries of public programs to better understand 
‘citizen-state interactions’ (Jakobsen et al. 2019) and policy implementation (Hudson et 
al. 2019). This, along with a push for more research on public administration in 
developing countries (Bertelli et al. 2020), has led to studies that focus on citizens’ 
experiences of interacting with the bureaucracy in developing countries (Heinrich 2016; 
Nisar 2018). This paper aims to draw from, and contribute to, this growing literature by 
studying the implementation of a maternal and child health conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) program in India. 
In this paper, I present findings from interviews with beneficiaries and administrators 
of the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY), a national conditional maternity 
benefits11 program in India, to better understand the challenges of implementing 
demand-side health policies in developing countries. This qualitative study was 
conducted in response to the first chapter of this dissertation where I did not find any 
large significant differences in health-seeking behaviors for births in villages along the 
borders of IGMSY districts. 
In the following section, I discuss the literature on the implementation of maternal and 
child health CCT programs in India, focusing specifically on qualitative studies. I 
 
11 Maternity benefit programs aim to compensate lost wages for women during their pregnancy. These programs are 
called conditional maternity benefit programs if beneficiaries are required to fulfil conditions to receive the benefit. 
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describe the research context and methodology in the third section. In the fourth 
section, I present findings from my qualitative interviews. I conclude with a discussion 
of my findings. I identify three themes that explain the limited effectiveness of the 
program: first, administrative burdens in the form of high learning and compliance 
costs experienced by beneficiaries; second, the role of street-level bureaucrats 
responsible for the ‘last-mile delivery’ of the program; and third, the limited 
administrative capacity at the sub-district level. 
 
2. Maternal and Child Health CCT Programs in India 
Most studies on maternal and child health CCT programs in India either consist of 
impact evaluations that examine the effect of financial incentives on maternal and child 
health outcomes (Raghunathan et al. 2017; Ghosh and Kochar 2016; Powell-Jackson et al. 
2015; Joshi and Sivaram 2014) or program evaluations that focus on performance 
indicators such as levels of awareness, coverage of eligible beneficiaries and receipt of 
benefits (Vellakkal et al. 2017). The latter predominantly focus on the Janani Suraksha 
Yojana (a national institutional delivery CCT program implemented in 2005), with a few 
examining the Muthulakshmi Reddy Maternity Benefits Scheme in Tamil Nadu 
(Balasubramanian and Ravindran 2012) and the Mamata program in Odisha (Ali et al. 
2018). A small number of studies use qualitative methods to study the implementation 
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of these programs (Coffey 2014; Sinha et al. 2015). See Jain and Mittal (2018) for an 
overview of studies focusing on cash transfers for maternal and child health in India. 
Two studies have focused on the Indira Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY or the 
Motherhood Support Program), the program of interest in this paper: a large 18-state 
household survey commissioned by the government of India (NITI Aayog 2017) and a 
4-state qualitative study by Sinha et al. (2015). While the former described the program 
as a success with some scope for improvement, the latter was critical of the program’s 
design and implementation. According to Sinha et al. (2015), the program failed to 
realize its main objective of providing wage compensation for pregnant women. By 
imposing conditionalities, it limited the ability of women to access their right to 
maternity benefits12 under the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. They also 
highlight other issues such as the inadequacy of the cash amount and long delays in the 
release of funds from the central government to state governments. 
In this paper, I add to this literature on the implementation of maternal and child health 
CCT programs in India in three ways. First, I provide the perspective of frontline 
workers responsible for implementing the program. Most studies listed above have 
focused on beneficiaries. Second, I compare the implementation of the program in 
districts with varying levels of administrative capacity. This helps provide a 
 
12 The NFSA provides a maternity benefit of ₹6000 ($81) “in such installments as prescribed by the Central 
Government” to all women (except those employed by the government). 
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comparative account of the implementation in high, medium and low-performing 
districts. Third, I highlight the importance of focusing on sub-district administration to 
better understand implementation in rural areas. As most studies use the individual, 
household, village, district, state or national level as their unit of analysis, a very 
important group of sub-district administrators are left out from these analyses. As I 
found out during fieldwork, it is these sub-district administrators that hold the key to 
the program’s success in rural locations.  
 
3. Research Context and Methodology 
This study aims to develop a better understanding of the implementation of the Indira 
Gandhi Matritva Sahyog Yojana (IGMSY or the Indira Gandhi Motherhood Support 
Program) in rural areas. The program was rolled out in 52 of India’s 640 districts in 
2011. These districts were selected13 to ensure that it was initially implemented in a mix 
of high, medium and low performing districts and at least one district from each of 
India’s 36 states and union territories. Figure 3 shows the important stakeholders and 
their responsibilities in the implementation of the program. 
The program is implemented through a network of childcare centers run by the 
Ministry of Women and Child Development (MoWCD) as part of the Integrated Child 
 
13 See Section 3 of Chapter I for more information about the program. 
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Development Services (ICDS). There are over 1.3 million ICDS childcare centers across 
India (program guidelines require one childcare center for every 300 individuals). The 
MoWCD formulates policy guidelines and provides funds for IGMSY to all state 
governments. At the state level, each district’s Women and Child Development office 
(henceforth referred to as the ‘district office’) is responsible for managing the 
implementation of the program in their respective districts. Each district is further 
divided into sub-district administrative units (blocks) with each having a Block Women 
and Child Development office (henceforth referred to as the ‘block office’). Each block 
office has a team of supervisors and each supervisor is responsible for overseeing a 
group of childcare centers in the block.  
When a pregnant woman visits a childcare center, the childcare worker informs her 
about IGMSY and enrolls her in the program by providing a mother and child 
protection card (used for tracking the fulfillment of all conditions). Once the enrolled 
beneficiary fulfills the conditions set out in the program guidelines, she submits the 
required documents (copies of national ID, bank passbook and mother and child 
protection card) to the childcare worker. The childcare worker verifies the documents 
and submits them to her supervisor. The supervisor verifies the documents and submits 
them to the block office. The block office submits a list of beneficiaries who have 
fulfilled the conditions to the bank and district office. The bank approves the payment 
and transfers the money to the beneficiaries’ accounts. The IGMSY program guidelines 
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recommend that payments should be made within 30 days of fulfilling all 
conditionalities for a particular installment (MoWCD 2011). 
Selection of Sample Districts and Respondents 
This study was conducted in four of the 52 districts where IGMSY was implemented. 
As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, IGMSY was implemented in a mix 
of high, medium and low performing districts. These districts were selected using a 
composite score developed by the MoWCD using six maternal and child health 
indicators before the program was rolled out. For this study, I selected four districts: 
one high, one medium and two low performing districts. These districts were selected 
to ensure they were spread across different regions of the country (east, west and 
north). I did not select any districts the south as I do not speak south Indian languages. 
Table 6 provides details of the number of interviews conducted in each district. 
In each district, I selected two blocks (one block neighboring the district headquarters 
and the other away from the district headquarters). In each block, I randomly selected 
two villages and interviewed all women who were pregnant between 2011 and 2016, 
the reference period of the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) used in the 
quantitative analysis of IGMSY in the first chapter of this dissertation. I interviewed a 
total of 147 beneficiaries and 24 administrators. Administrators included childcare 
workers, supervisors and block officials. While childcare workers were interviewed in 
each village, block officials and supervisors were interviewed based on availability. I 
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was unable to conduct interviews in one of the four villages in Bhilwara district due to 
bad weather. 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with program administrators and beneficiaries 
to discuss the implementation of IGMSY. Interviews with beneficiaries were conducted 
at their homes and were approximately 30-45 minutes long. Interviews with 
administrators ranged from 30-60 minutes depending on their availability. I received 
approval to interview human subjects from the Syracuse University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB). Following the IRB protocol approved for this study, I obtained oral 
consent from all respondents and did not collect any information about personally 
identifiable characteristics. I took hand-written notes rather than audio recording the 
interviews. This helped improve the quality of interviews as respondents (particularly 
administrators) were more open to sharing information about their experiences with the 
program as their comments could not be attributable to them.  
To analyze the data, I conducted a thematic analysis of all my interviews to identify 
recurring themes. In this paper, I present an overview of program implementation 
across all four districts and focus on three themes that emerged from my qualitative 
findings. Wherever possible, I do this by ‘showing’ rather than ‘telling’ (i.e. I share 
quotes rather than paraphrase them). The purpose of this paper is not to make 
generalizable or causal claims about the performance of IGMSY but identify and discuss 
challenges during the implementation of maternal and child health CCT programs. 
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Sample Characteristics 
To provide a better sense of the rural areas in each district, Table 7 presents data on 
district-level socio-economic characteristics from the Census of India (2011). There is a 
high correlation between performance type and socio-economic indicators. Rural 
populations living in Dehradun, the high-performing district, have the highest levels of 
literacy, use of banking services and mobile phone connectivity followed by those in 
Patan, the medium-performing district. Simdega and Bhilwara are two of the poorest 
districts in India: while the former is a remote district in eastern India, the latter is 
located along an important national highway in western India. Bhilwara’s location 
along this highway explains the high percentage of households with mobile phones and 
electricity. The large gap in female literacy between the two districts can be explained 
by the large presence of Christian missionaries in Simdega. Simdega has a 
predominantly tribal population. 
 
4. Findings 
These interviews aim to develop a better understanding of the implementation process 
by gauging administrators and beneficiaries’ experiences with IGMSY concerning their 
awareness about the program, the application process and payments of maternity 
benefits. I was also keen on comparing these experiences across the three types of 
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districts, each with varying levels of administrative capacity. In this section, I begin by 
sharing insights into these questions and then focus on three broad themes that emerge 
from my qualitative analysis. 
 
Overview of Program Implementation 
Program Awareness 
Awareness about a program among intended beneficiaries is critical for its success. This 
is particularly true for maternity benefits programs as the program is targeted at a 
specific group (pregnant women) and provides a one-time benefit. These characteristics 
of maternity benefits programs (and demand-side health interventions in general) limit 
opportunities for “demonstration effects” that are common in programs that provide 
regular benefits such as in-kind subsidies and social security payments. 
Levels of awareness differed considerably across all four districts. All respondents in 
Dehradun, the high performing district, were aware of the program. They knew what 
documents were required and were able to share details about payments. In Patan, the 
medium performing district, most respondents were aware of the program but few 
could share information about the application process and payments. A possible 
explanation for this difference is the gap in female literacy rates in the two districts. 
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In the low performing districts, levels of awareness about the program were in stark 
contrast to those in Dehradun and Patan. Respondents in two of the four villages in 
Simdega had never heard about the program, seven years after it was rolled out. The 
childcare worker in one of these villages explained that she decided not to implement 
the program as initial applicants did not receive any payments and accused her of 
stealing the money (this case is discussed in more detail later). In villages where the 
program was functioning, most respondents who had applied for maternity benefits 
could not confirm whether they had received their payments. I had to request them to 
show their bank passbooks to verify if they had received their payments (in most cases 
these passbooks were not up to date). Levels of awareness about the application process 
and payments were higher among respondents in Simdega compared to Bhilwara 
which could be explained by the gap in female literacy rates in the two districts. 
Respondents across all four districts were not aware of the ‘wage compensation’ 
objective of the program. Those aware of the program listed nutrition as the main 
objective of the cash benefit. This was not surprising as all 15 childcare workers 
interviewed did not mention ‘wage compensation’ as one of the objectives of the 
program. By providing wage compensation, maternity benefits programs hope to 
reduce the workload of pregnant women and allow them to rest before and after their 
delivery. According to a childcare worker in Bhilwara, this might not be an effective 
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strategy for women living in intergenerational families who mostly engage in informal 
agricultural and domestic work: 
 No amount of money can reduce the workload for women in villages. If the 
government wants women to take rest [during their pregnancy], they will have 
to speak with the mother-in-law. They are the ones who determine their 
daughter-in-law’s workload. 
While most respondents in Dehradun reported reducing their agricultural and 
household responsibilities before and after their delivery, respondents in other districts 
tended to continue their household responsibilities while reducing their participation in 
agricultural work. In Simdega, one of the respondents, who had given birth to twins a 
month before the interview, was transplanting rice while breastfeeding one of her 
infants before we started the interview. 
Application Process 
Being a national program, the application process was the same across all four districts. 
However, beneficiaries’ experiences with the application process differed considerably 
across districts. In Dehradun, most respondents who had applied for maternity benefits 
found the application process straightforward and did not have any specific complaints. 
In Patan, while many respondents were not familiar with the application process, other 
members in their households were aware of the documents required for the application. 
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In Patan, childcare workers expressed concern about the application for the second 
installment as many women leave the village to travel to their parent’s homes for their 
delivery. This creates a challenge for childcare workers as they cannot follow up with 
the beneficiary. According to a childcare worker in Patan: 
In our area, most women go to their parents’ homes for their delivery. I make 
sure they carry their MCP card with them and get the newborn vaccinated. If 
they are from a nearby village, I usually know the childcare worker and ask her 
to make sure the newborn receives all vaccinations and the MCP card is updated. 
Despite my best efforts, some women forget to carry their MCP cards or miss one 
of the vaccinations. 
In Bhilwara and Simdega, beneficiaries expressed multiple concerns about the 
application process. In two villages in Simdega, childcare workers demanded ₹50-100 
from beneficiaries to process applications. According to one of the childcare workers: 
This program creates so much work for us [childcare workers]. We have to 
collect all the documents, get them photocopied and then submit the application 
on behalf of the applicant. The closest photocopy shop is half an hour away from 
the village. The supervisor does not come to the village so I hand over the 
applications to her at the block. You tell me, who will cover all these costs?   
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The limited facilities in the villages in these two districts made the application process 
more challenging. Unlike Dehradun and Patan where applicants could get their 
documents updated at common service centers14 (CSCs) or open a bank account at the 
nearest bank, in Simdega and Bhilwara applicants had to travel long distances (often to 
the block or district headquarters) to get access to basic services. As most rural areas 
have limited transportation options (in the villages I visited in Simdega there was only 
one bus that left for the block/district every morning and returned the same evening), a 
simple task like opening a bank account to receive maternity benefits can take an entire 
day.  
Payment of Maternity Benefits 
IGMSY program guidelines state that payments should be made “within 30 days of the 
fulfillment of the conditionality” for each installment as “receiving the financial benefits 
timely by the beneficiary is imperative for the success of the Scheme. (MoWCD 2011)” 
IGMSY beneficiaries across all four districts faced extreme delays in receiving 
payments. Not only did this reduce the program’s effectiveness in ensuring additional 
income for women during their pregnancy but also reduced interest in the program. 
In Dehradun, most respondents reported receiving payments within six to nine months 
of submitting their applications for each installment. Eligible beneficiaries in Patan had 
 
14 Common Service Centers (CSCs) are set up by the Ministry of Electronics and Informaiton Techology to provide 
e-services in rural areas. 
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a similar experience although some respondents received all three payments together, 
more than a year after their delivery. This is how one respondent in Patan described 
these bunched payments: 
My husband provided all the documents to the childcare worker a month after 
we found out I was pregnant. She told us we would receive the first installment 
in a few weeks. A few months later our son was born and we had not received 
any money. We submitted the documents for the second and third installments. 
We kept checking our bank account but no money was deposited. We finally 
received all three payments when our son was a year and a half old. 
Other respondents had similar stories to share with all three payments arriving months 
after their delivery. Childcare workers in Patan attributed this to teething troubles 
associated with the initial rollout of the program. According to them, once the program 
was scaled up in 2017, the application process became more streamlined leading to 
relatively shorter delays. A similar observation was shared by block officials in 
Dehradun. 
In Simdega and Bhilwara, beneficiaries shared accounts of excessively long delays in 
receiving payments, ranging from a year to three years. In some cases, respondents 
never received all three installments. As one respondent in Simdega district described 
her experience: 
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When I registered for my pregnancy at the childcare center, the childcare worker 
told me about the program [IGMSY] and asked for a copy of my bank passbook 
and Aadhaar [UID] card. I did not have a bank account so I had to open a new 
bank account. Our son was born in July 2013 but we received no payments. We 
received ₹2500 in September 2015. That was all that we received [of the total 
benefit of ₹4000]. Who knows where the remaining money went? 
The childcare worker in this village explained that while this was not very common, 
there were cases where payments never reached beneficiaries’ bank accounts. She 
followed up with her supervisor and the block office but it was unclear what happened 
to these payments. 
In summary, there were major differences in policy implementation across the three 
types of districts. The program was relatively well implemented in the high performing 
district and, to some extent, in the medium performing district. In the low performing 
districts, there were many challenges in the effective implementation of the program. 
There were some common challenges faced across all districts: long delays in payments 
of maternity benefits and no awareness about the ‘wage compensation’ objective of the 
program. 
Three broad themes emerge from my qualitative findings that help explain the 
challenges in implementing maternal and child health CCT programs in rural India. 
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These include administrative burdens experienced by beneficiaries in their interaction 
with the state, the pivotal role of street-level bureaucrats in ensuring ‘last-mile delivery’ 
of the program and the lack of administrative capacity at the block level. 
 
Administrative Burden 
Moynihan, Herd and Harvey (2015) conceptualize administrative burdens as “a 
function of learning, psychological and compliance costs that citizens experience in 
their interactions with government.” Respondents across all four districts identified 
various learning and compliance costs associated with the maternity benefits program. 
While the former resulted from the program’s limited outreach to intended 
beneficiaries, the latter was a consequence of onerous documentation requirements to 
prove eligibility. Respondents in the low-performing districts also highlighted the 
additional administrative burdens associated with opening bank accounts and 
accessing payments through the banking system. 
Across all four districts, all respondents who were aware of the program had heard 
about it from their childcare workers. The reliance on childcare workers as the main, 
and often only, source of information was a major limitation in the program’s design. It 
limited the effectiveness of the program in areas where childcare workers are either 
overworked or inefficient. For instance, in the two villages in Simdega, where the 
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childcare worker stopped implementing the program, none of the eligible beneficiaries 
were aware of the program. It also reduced the likelihood of households that are less 
likely to visit the childcare center to learn more about the program.  
Among those respondents who had applied for maternity benefits, many described the 
application process as being cumbersome. A common complaint was regarding the 
requirement of submitting separate applications (and accompanying copies of UID, 
passbook and MCP card) for each of the three installments. This was particularly 
burdensome for beneficiaries in Bhilwara and Simdega where none of the seven villages 
had a photocopying machine. Beneficiaries had to either travel to the nearest town to 
get documents photocopied or pay an additional fee to the childcare worker to do it for 
them.  
Some documentation requirements related to the Unique Identification (UID) card 
created compliance costs for many recently married women. While program guidelines 
do not require beneficiaries to have a UID card, all childcare workers reported that they 
had been asked to reject any application that did not have a copy of the applicant’s UID 
card. Though UID coverage rates are high and most respondents reported having a UID 
card, many complained that their applications were not accepted by the childcare 
worker because their UID card did not have their spouse’s name and address. In rural 
India, many marriages take place between households from different villages and it is 
common for women to move to their husband’s village after marriage. Many young 
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mothers complained that while they had their UID cards, the cards had their former 
addresses. As a respondent’s husband in Simdega described their ordeal of updating 
his wife’s UID card: 
When we got married, we added her name to our ration [food subsidy] card. We 
submitted that as proof of address for maternity benefits. The childcare worker 
said only an Aadhaar [UID] card would be accepted as proof of address. We went 
to the block to get the Aadhaar card updated but the server was down. They sent 
us to the district office. We waited at the district office but the queue was too 
long. We went again the following week and spent a whole day at the district 
office. It was updated after a lot of difficulties. 
The block office is an hour-long bus ride away from this village. The district office is an 
additional two hours away from the block. He estimated they spent approximately 
₹1000 to get her UID card updated. A UID card can be updated online by uploading 
documents to the UID website. However, many rural households do not own a 
smartphone and do not have access to the internet. 
Interaction with the banking system was another avenue for learning and compliance 
costs. Most rural households rely on their bank passbooks, which are updated when 
they visit the bank, to keep an account of payments. For beneficiaries who do not 
receive any regular income in their bank account, there is no incentive to make a trip to 
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the bank to fill in their passbooks. The reliance on bank passbooks, combined with the 
long delays in payments, made it difficult for many respondents to confirm if they had 
received their payments. While banks allow beneficiaries to link their bank accounts to 
phone numbers and receive notifications through messages, very few respondents were 
familiar with this service. 
The learning and compliance costs associated with banking differed considerably across 
districts. In Dehradun, most respondents had updated bank passbooks and used phone 
messages to keep track of payments. All respondents were able to provide information 
about the status of benefit payments. In Patan, most households relied on bank 
passbooks to monitor payments. With better connectivity, banks were accessible and 
many respondents had updated passbooks. In Bhilwara and Simdega, most households 
were unaware of their payments. In Simdega, for instance, there was only one bank at 
the block level compared to multiple banks at the block level in Patan. 
 
Role of Street-level Bureaucrats 
Childcare workers play a pivotal role in the last-mile delivery of maternity benefits. As 
the main source of information about the program and the main facilitator for the 
application process, they are an important determinant of the success of the program. 
Across all four districts, childcare workers had a common grievance: the new maternal 
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and child health CCT program had imposed an additional burden on already 
overworked and underpaid childcare workers. As a childcare worker in Simdega 
described this:  
Asking us to implement this program without a pay hike is like throwing salt on 
our wounds. You [the department] want us to maintain all these records 
[pointing at a pile of registers], conduct door-to-door household visits, distribute 
take-home rations and now chase pregnant women to fill forms for this program. 
This sentiment was expressed by most childcare workers across all four districts. 
Childcare workers are paid ₹4500 per month which is less than the average minimum 
wage for unskilled manual labor (i.e. ₹200 per day) in India. While the program makes a 
provision of an incentive of ₹200 for the childcare worker for each beneficiary who 
receives all three payments, it hardly compensates for the additional workload. 
According to a childcare worker in Bhilwara:  
What will ₹200 do? It does not even begin to cover the costs we incur to get 
pregnant women to apply for the program… photocopies, trips to the bank to 
open bank accounts for pregnant women and the constant complaints from 
applicants whose payments are delayed. Do you know an ASHA [healthcare 
worker] earns this amount for encouraging a single ANC [antenatal checkup]? 
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Many childcare workers were unhappy about the incentive amount and compared it to 
the incentives received by village-level healthcare workers for tasks such as 
encouraging a pregnant woman to get an antenatal checkup. Unlike childcare workers 
who receive a monthly salary, ASHAs are volunteer healthcare workers who receive 
incentives for every task they perform. While it is unfair for childcare workers to 
compare their salary with an ASHAs incentive, it does show how small the incentive 
amount under IGMSY is as childcare workers only get that amount after a beneficiary 
fulfills all the conditions for all three installments. 
According to some childcare workers, most of the program beneficiaries were 
individuals who were likely to have visited the childcare center irrespective of the 
maternity benefits. In Bhilwara, one childcare worker had this to say: 
People who visit the childcare center are receiving the program benefit because I 
ask them to fill their forms as they are already meeting all the criteria. The 
problem is reaching out to people who are not coming to the childcare center. 
This was a common observation by childcare workers in low performing districts. 
Many childcare workers believed that the program was unable to reach out to 
households that were not regular users of the childcare center. In one village in 
Bhilwara, houses were separated into two distinct settlements. The larger settlement 
consisted of upper caste households and a smaller settlement (about 2 kilometers away) 
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had a group of 10-12 tribal households. The childcare center was in the main settlement. 
Most respondents from the tribal settlement were not aware of the program. None of 
their children attended the childcare center. According to the childcare worker for this 
village: 
There is a limit to what we [childcare workers] can do. I can tell people about the 
program, but I cannot force them to participate. How many times should I tell 
them? I have visited the tribal settlement many times, but the families show no 
interest in the program. Some of the pregnant women are below 18 years of age 
and are not eligible to participate. Other families refuse to get vaccinations. What 
am I supposed to do? 
Difficulties in reaching out to households that are not regular users of childcare centers 
was a major concern in low performing districts where childcare workers have limited 
resources (such as no electricity or cooking stoves which leaves them with no option but 
to cook meals on firewood) and more workload than their counterparts in better-
performing districts. According to the program rules of the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS), there should be a childcare center for every 300 
individuals. As low-performing districts tend to have higher fertility rates, they have 
more children per childcare center. When I visited the childcare centers in Dehradun, 
most did not have any children present. A childcare worker explained that many 
households have stopped sending their children to the childcare centers: 
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On most days there are no children at the center. If some child shows up, I cook 
lunch for them. People in our villages have become rich. Everyone wants to send 
their children to private English-medium schools in Vikasnagar [nearest town]. 
Earlier they would send their children to the childcare center and then the 
government-run primary school. Only once the child was 7 or 8 years old, they 
would send them to the good [private school] school. In the past few years, so 
many private nursery schools have opened up in Vikasnagar, so parents send 
their 4 to 6-year-olds to those schools. 
While the role of childcare workers in Dehradun (and to some extent Patan) was 
primarily maintaining health records and distributing take-home food packets to 
pregnant women, their counterparts in Bhilwara and Simdega had the additional 
responsibility of taking care of 3 to 6-year-old children attending the childcare center 
every day. 
 
Limited Administrative Capacity 
Painter and Pierre (2005) define administrative capacity as “the ability to manage 
efficiently the human and physical resources required for delivering the outputs of 
government.” Wu et al. (2015) further develop this concept by distinguishing between 
three types of competencies (analytical, operational and political) at three different 
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levels (individual, organizational and systemic). I focus on the organizational-
operational capacity that examines how policy implementation is organized and how 
administrators operate and perform (El-Taliawi and Van Der Wal 2019). 
Administrative capacity differed considerably across districts based on their 
‘performance type.’ In Dehradun and Patan, the high and medium performing districts, 
all childcare centers were open during work hours. Block officials and supervisors were 
responsive to requests for interviews and available at the block office. In Bhilwara and 
Simdega, the low-performing districts, few childcare centers opened regularly and 
childcare workers were working with limited resources. In both these districts, the 
block offices were rarely open and most block officials did not live in the block. There 
were multiple supervisor and block official positions vacant which further limited the 
ability of the childcare workers to implement the program.  
In two villages of a remote block in Simdega District, none of the respondents had 
heard about the maternity benefits program. According to the childcare worker in one 
village, her attempts to help eligible beneficiaries apply for the program backfired. 
I filled forms in 2012 but no one received benefits. When no one received 
anything, people started accusing me of eating up all their money. I did not like 
that, so I stopped filling forms. 
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It was unclear how a childcare worker could decide to stop implementing a national 
program without their supervisor or block official’s knowledge. As described in the 
process flow diagram in Figure 3, while the childcare center is responsible for the 
frontline implementation of the program, it is the block office that monitors the 
program’s implementation through its team of supervisors. In both blocks of Simdega 
district, the supervisor and block officials were unavailable for interviews. All calls to 
supervisors went unanswered and the block offices in both blocks did not open for four 
consecutive weekdays. The owner of a tea shop near one of the block offices informed 
me that the office is rarely open and the block officer conducts her official duties from 
her home in the nearest city, two hours away from the block office by bus.  
The missing block officials and supervisors were not unique to Simdega. In Bhilwara, 
the other low-performing district, a similar story played out. The block office was 
closed on three of the four days I was conducting fieldwork. On the fourth day, only a 
clerk was present in the office. When I asked the clerk about the long delays in the 
processing of applications and delivery of benefits, he blamed the understaffing. 
Of the 9 supervisor posts in our block, only one is filled. There should have been 
9 supervisors monitoring 30 childcare centers each but currently, one supervisor 
is looking after more than 250 centers. That should give you your answer. 
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With eight of the nine supervisor positions vacant, the sole supervisor for this large 
block was managing approximately 250 childcare centers. Besides her regular duties 
that involve supervising record-keeping of each childcare center, she is also responsible 
for collecting applications for the maternity benefits program and ensuring these forms 
are correctly filled and delivered to the block office. Like Simdega, the block officials 
lived away from the block and did not come to work regularly. According to the clerk: 
No one wants to work here. Who would want to come and live here? The roads 
are bad. There are no good schools. Only someone with bad karma would get 
this position. 
 
5. Discussion 
This qualitative study was conducted as a follow-up to a quantitative evaluation that 
found no large significant differences in health-seeking behaviors among births in 
villages where the program was implemented and those across the district border in 
villages that did not receive the program. To better understand these findings, I 
interviewed program beneficiaries and administrators in four districts that received the 
program. As is evident from the findings of this study, while eligible beneficiaries 
applied for maternity benefits and received payments under the program, there were 
many issues in the implementation of the program that limited the ability of the 
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program to achieve effective last-mile delivery of program benefits. Though the 
findings of this study cannot be generalized to all program districts, it does provide 
possible explanations for the limited effectiveness of the program in increasing health-
seeking behaviors. More importantly, it identifies avenues for improving the 
implementation process to ensure easier and timely delivery of program benefits. 
As mentioned by childcare workers across all four districts, the program worked for 
individuals who were already accessing childcare centers but was unable to incentivize 
households on the margins. A combination of administrative burdens on beneficiaries, 
the role of street-level bureaucrats in the last-mile delivery and limited administrative 
capacity in remote districts, curbed the program’s ability to reach out to excluded 
households. These findings raise some concerns about using national demand-side 
health policies to improve health outcomes. 
First, the use of banks for payments and national biometric identification (UID), while 
done to reduce corruption, have made it more difficult for beneficiaries to access 
program benefits. The burden of such initiatives falls largely on those beneficiaries who 
are the main target of the program (households in remote locations who are less likely 
to access healthcare services). Pritchett et al. (2013), while discussing foreign aid in 
underdeveloped countries, use the term premature load bearing to describe a situation 
where “pushing too hard, too soon” causes “stresses to exceed capability.” The use of 
new policy instruments that leverage innovative technologies in settings with limited 
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administrative capabilities creates a similar situation in underdeveloped districts. As 
Brodkin and Manmundar (2017) describe it “simplification has given way to increased 
complexity in the administration of public benefits.” 
Second, the role of street-level bureaucrats is critical in achieving successful last-mile 
delivery of program benefits. According to Hunter and Murray (2017), when demand-
side interventions have included additional investment in health facilities and staff, 
there has been an increase in health-seeking behaviors. Similarly, when “well-
supported and supervised” community workers have been involved as facilitators, 
there have been high levels of awareness about programs. 
Finally, the use of ‘one-size-fits-all’ national policies such as IGMSY fails to 
acknowledge the differences in administrative capacities in different areas. In 
developing countries such as Brazil, India and South Africa, individual states are often 
larger than many countries which raises concerns about the effectiveness of national 
social programs with standardized eligibility criteria and benefits. This is particularly 
true for India where a one-size-fits-all approach to solving policy problems can further 
exacerbate regional differences in development. As illustrated in this paper, while the 
program worked well in the high and medium performing districts, where maternal 
and child health indicators were already high, the program overburdened a precarious 
administrative setup in low performing districts. 
70 
 
6. Tables and Figures 
Figure 3: Process Flow of IGMSY 
  
 
Table 6: Sample Districts 
District Name (State) Performance 
Type 
Number 
of 
villages 
No. of 
beneficiaries 
interviewed 
No. of 
administrators 
interviewed 
Dehradun (Uttarakhand) High 4 44 9 
Patan (Gujarat) Medium 4 40 7 
Simdega (Jharkhand) Low 4 39 4 
Bhilwara (Rajasthan) Low 3 24 4 
Total 15 147 24 
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Table 7: District-wise Socio-Economic Characteristics of Rural Populations 
District Name 
(State) 
Dehradun 
(Uttarakhand) 
Patan 
(Gujarat) 
Simdega 
(Jharkhand) 
Bhilwara 
(Rajasthan) 
Performance Type High Medium Low Low 
Individuals (%)     
Literacy rate (males) 87.6 80.9 75.0 71.3 
Literacy rate (females) 66.8 57.0 58.2 40.6 
Scheduled Caste 15.8 9.1 7.7 17.5 
Scheduled Tribes 13.4 0.6 72.7 11.3 
Household-level (%)     
Availing banking services 79.9 48.6 42.5 71.6 
Have mobile phones 67.8 56.9 18.8 59.2 
Have toilets 75.1 37.1 5.4 11.3 
Have electricity 94.5 79.7 10.6 71.1 
Source: Census of India (2011) 
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Chapter III: Increasing Utilization of Public Health Insurance Programs: 
Evidence from an Experiment in India 
 
1. Introduction 
Low levels of awareness about social programs among intended beneficiaries are one of 
the main factors responsible for low uptake and utilization of these programs (World 
Bank 2011; Currie 2006). This is particularly true for social programs where benefits are 
not availed regularly. A case in point is public health insurance programs where many 
enrolled beneficiaries are unaware of how to avail benefits when they face health shocks 
(Prinja et al. 2017; Swarup and Jain 2010). Often health insurance programs are highly 
subsidized by the government and this further limit awareness as there is no buy-in 
from beneficiaries. The likelihood of low levels of awareness is higher in populations 
that have low levels of literacy and live in locations with low utilization of the program 
(Fadlallah et al. 2018). While low literacy increases the likelihood of “understanding 
failures” as beneficiaries are unable to understand the concept of health insurance 
(Platteau and Ontiveros 2013), low utilization of the program limits “demonstration 
effects” as beneficiaries are unable to learn from those living around them (Palacios and 
Hou 2011). 
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In this paper, we examine the issue of low levels of awareness among beneficiaries of 
public health insurance programs by focusing on the rollout of India’s Rashtriya 
Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY or the national health insurance program). The 
government of India introduced RSBY to reduce out-of-pocket expenditures on 
healthcare among low-income households. However, early studies of the program 
showed that while there was high enrollment in the program, the utilization of benefits 
was very low (Sun 2011; Palacios and Hou 2010). Most studies attributed the low levels 
of utilization to a lack of awareness about the program among beneficiaries (La Forgia 
and Nagpal 2012). To address these concerns, many government agencies used 
information, education and communication (IEC) methods such as information 
pamphlets and health camps to increase awareness about the program. We had the 
opportunity to work with the Government of Karnataka, a state in southern India, to 
assist them in developing new IEC methods to increase levels of awareness in districts 
with low RSBY utilization. In this paper, we present findings from a quasi-experiment 
that evaluated the impact of village-level awareness meetings, an IEC method designed 
after studying the advantages and limitations of existing IEC methods, in 61 villages of 
Chamarajanagara district in Karnataka. 
We use findings from this quasi-experiment to answer the following question: do 
village-level awareness meetings increase the utilization of public health insurance 
programs among hard-to-reach populations? We find that village-level awareness 
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meetings conducted by a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) increase program 
utilization and provide government agencies an excellent opportunity to monitor 
program implementation in remote locations. This paper contributes to the 
implementation and public health insurance literature at a time when many 
governments in developing countries are moving from public provisioning of 
healthcare to a mixed model of healthcare that includes demand-side health 
interventions such as health insurance. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY), India’s national health insurance program. The 
third section discusses the problem of low utilization of RSBY due to low levels of 
awareness. The fourth section describes village-level awareness meetings, the IEC 
intervention designed by the authors. The fifth section focuses on the design of our 
quasi-experiment and discusses issues in randomization. The sixth section presents the 
results of the experiment. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy 
implications of the findings from this study. 
 
2. Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana (RSBY) 
In April 2008, the government of India rolled out the Rashtriya Swasthiya Bima Yojana 
(RSBY or national health insurance program) to provide annual health insurance 
coverage of ₹30,000 ($420) to all low-income households in India. By introducing a 
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national health insurance program, the government supplemented the existing public 
provisioning of health care with a national health insurance program. The latter 
allowed beneficiaries to access private healthcare by enrolling in RSBY at no cost as the 
government fully subsidizes the premium. This policy shift was a response to 
information collected by the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in 2004 
(Ravi et al. 2016; Berman et al. 2010) that showed high out-of-pocket expenditures by 
low-income households on private healthcare despite having access to free healthcare at 
public hospitals. La Forgia and Nagpal (2012) attribute this to overcrowding and low 
quality of care provided by public hospitals in India.  
All households identified as living below the national poverty line can enroll up to five 
members in RSBY and avail of health insurance coverage of ₹30,000 ($405). The central 
and state governments (75:25) fully subsidize the health insurance premiums and 
households only pay ₹30 ($0.4) as a registration fee during enrollment. RSBY covers all 
pre-existing diseases and does not have deductibles or co-payments. RSBY households 
can avail of in-patient care at any RSBY-empaneled hospital across the country. All 
households receive a biometric smart card that helps hospitals verify patients’ 
identities. Figure 4 describes the process flow of the program. 
The Ministry of Labor and Employment (MoLE) is responsible for formulating the 
policy at the national level. The State Nodal Agency (SNA), based within a department 
of each state government, is responsible for implementing the policy at the state level. 
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Each state selects insurance companies to provide health insurance under RSBY to its 
low-income population through a competitive bidding process every year (most states 
bid groups of districts and can have more than one insurance company working in their 
state in any given year). The SNA provides the insurance companies with a list of 
eligible households and gives them three months to complete enrollment. Insurance 
companies have two tasks: enrolling all eligible beneficiaries by providing them 
biometric smart cards and managing hospitalization claims by making payments to 
hospitals. They hire smart card service providers (SCSPs) and third-party 
administrators (TPAs) to enroll beneficiaries and manage insurance claims, respectively. 
TPAs are also responsible for empaneling all hospitals that are interested in 
participating in the program. For more information about RSBY see Azam (2018) and 
Sengupta and Rooj (2019). 
 
Enrollment 
Smart card service providers (SCSPs) set up enrollment stations in various locations to 
allow eligible households to enroll in the program. When eligible households (up to five 
members) visit the enrollment center, the SCSP captures their thumb impressions and 
photographs on a laptop. This information is stored on a chip-enabled smart card that 
has the head of the family’s name, photo and age printed on it. Once printed, the smart 
card is activated by a designated government employee (also known as the Field Key 
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Officer or FKO) to ensure cards are not distributed to non-eligible households. The 
enrollment team collects ₹30 as a registration fee from the beneficiary and hands over 
the smart card to them. The card is provided ‘on-the-spot’ to reduce delays and 
corruption in the application process that are common in other social programs (World 
Bank 2011). The enrollment team also provides the newly enrolled household with a 
booklet that includes information about the program and a list of RSBY-empaneled 
hospitals. 
 
Utilization 
Third-party administrators (TPAs) manage hospitalization claims under RSBY. They 
empanel hospitals under RSBY and are responsible for settling all insurance claims. 
When an individual with an RSBY card visits an RSBY-empaneled hospital, the hospital 
verifies their identity by using information from their smart card and matching 
fingerprints. The hospital then selects the required package from a list of RSBY 
packages available on the RSBY software. All RSBY packages have a predetermined rate 
and cover the cost of treatment, diagnostic tests, accommodation, medicines, food and 
travel (in the form of a fixed allowance). Once treatment is availed, the hospital uploads 
the required document on the RSBY website and the TPA makes the payment to the 
hospital (i.e. the hospitalization process is ‘cashless’ for the household). The latter is 
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important as most low-income households cannot afford to pay upfront hospitalization 
costs and reimburse these costs later. 
 
3. Low Awareness and Utilization of RSBY 
Low levels of awareness about availing benefits have been cited as an important reason 
for low utilization of RSBY (Thakur 2016; La Forgia and Nagpal 2012; Rajashekhar et al. 
2011). While most studies on RSBY rely on small-scale household surveys (leading to 
limited external generalizability of results), others like Shoree et al. (2014), Palacios and 
Hou (2011) and Sun (2011) use utilization data from the RSBY Monitoring Information 
System (MIS) to analyze trends in hospitalization across the country. Sun (2011) finds 
that only one-third of villages had any utilization in the first year of RSBY 
implementation. Palacios and Hou (2011) highlight the importance of “demonstration 
effects” in explaining why some villages have high utilization while others have none. 
They find that the “probability of an individual using RSBY is strongly related to the 
number of people in the same village that have already done so. (Palacios and Hou 
2011)” An interesting trend observed from the RSBY MIS is the relatively high 
enrollment in, but low utilization of, RSBY. Low utilization of RSBY in the early years of 
implementation is surprising given the phenomenon of pent-up demand that is 
commonly observed among newly insured individuals in public health insurance 
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programs (Fertig et al. 2018). Jain (2014) attributes this to a lack of awareness among 
beneficiaries about availing benefits under RSBY. 
Platteau and Ontiveros (2013) describe this as an “understanding failure” that results 
from “deficient information about the insurance product and the functioning of the 
program, poor understanding of the insurance concept … resulting in low use of the 
insurance product by eligible households.” They base this on their study of re-
enrollment in a micro health insurance program in rural India where beneficiaries had 
to pay the premiums. In RSBY, the likelihood of an understanding failure is higher as 
beneficiaries have limited “buy-in” to the program because the government pays the 
premium.  
To better understand the prevalence of low levels of awareness about RSBY among 
enrolled households, it is important to look at the program’s design. Figure 5 highlights 
the three main sources of information during RSBY implementation. 
The first and most important source of information is the insurance company. As 
insurance companies are paid premiums per household enrolled, it is in their interest to 
enroll all eligible households. The program design encourages insurance companies to 
find innovative ways to encourage eligible households to enroll in RSBY (to maximize 
revenues). In practice, as observed by the authors during interviews with stakeholders 
in Karnataka, insurance companies do not find it difficult to enroll households as the 
85 
 
program is fully subsidized by the government. When enrollment teams arrive at the 
enrollment station, people rush to get their free health insurance smart cards (as teams 
spend only 1-2 days at each station). Insurance companies are required to distribute 
information booklets/pamphlets during enrollment. However, the limited research that 
exists on the use of information pamphlets during RSBY enrollment suggests that they 
are not a very effective IEC method (Das and Leino 2011). A major reason for the poor 
implementation of IEC activities by insurance companies is the subcontracting of 
enrollment activities to smart card service providers (SCSPs). SCSPs work on low 
budgets and short timelines, which makes IEC activities a very low priority. 
The second source of information is RSBY-empaneled hospitals. By providing health 
insurance to low-income households, the government expected private hospitals to 
reach out to this new pool of customers, who could previously not afford private 
healthcare. However, our interviews with doctors from RSBY hospitals revealed that 
most private hospitals empaneled under RSBY already have a high number of patients 
(particularly in remote areas where there are limited healthcare facilities). Hospitals that 
do reach out to RSBY households focus primarily on urban low-income households 
because they are easily accessible (as most private hospitals are in urban areas). 
The third source of information is the state nodal agency (SNA). RSBY guidelines 
require state government agencies to conduct information, education and 
communication (IEC) activities to inform RSBY households about the program. For this 
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purpose, SNAs can use a part of the ₹30 ($0.4) registration fee collected from all 
households during the enrollment process. However, as highlighted by Johnson and 
Kumar (2013), government agencies are often understaffed and do not have the 
required administrative capacity to undertake IEC activities. In 2010, the MoLE 
requested nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to assist state government agencies 
in increasing awareness about the program among RSBY households. Over the next few 
years, many researchers evaluated various IEC activities such as the distribution of 
information pamphlets (Das and Leino 2011) and health camps in low utilization areas 
(Johnson and Kumar 2013) to understand the benefits and limitations of these varied 
approaches to increasing awareness about RSBY. 
Health camps and information pamphlets were two of the most used IEC methods 
adopted by state government agencies for increasing awareness about RSBY. While the 
former had doctors from RSBY network hospitals visiting smaller towns to meet rural 
RSBY beneficiaries from nearby villages (Johnson and Kumar 2013), the latter involved 
distributing pamphlets (or using wall paintings and posters) with information about 
RSBY benefits and hospitals to all RSBY households (Das and Leino 2011). The limited 
evidence available suggests that these methods were not effective in increasing 
awareness among households. A study by Johnson and Kumar (2013) that used 
randomized control trials to estimate the impact of health camps on RSBY utilization 
found no impact on hospital claims (utilization). The authors mention that most 
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attendees at these health camps were not eligible to enroll in RSBY as they were not 
from low-income households. As most health camps are conducted in smaller towns, it 
is difficult for RSBY beneficiaries from remote rural areas to attend these camps. While 
a case can be made for organizing health camps in large villages with low utilization (as 
opposed to smaller towns), the costs of organizing camps in remote locations are very 
high and many doctors from RSBY hospitals are unwilling to travel long distances to 
rural locations.  
 
4. Intervention 
Taking these limitations of existing IEC methods into account, we designed a new IEC 
intervention that uses village-level awareness meetings to disseminate information 
about RSBY in hard-to-reach areas with low RSBY utilization. Holding meetings at the 
village-level allows for better targeting of information to RSBY beneficiaries in low 
utilization villages and allows RSBY households to learn about the program directly 
from a trained resource person. Village-level awareness meetings involve the following 
steps: 
• Selection of training partner: First, the SNA selects a group of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) or government employees (frontline health or childcare 
workers) to conduct awareness meetings in low utilization areas. For our 
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experiment, we selected a state-level NGO to conduct awareness meetings as 
Karnataka’s SNA (Department of Labor) has very limited administrative capacity 
at the village-level. In states where SNAs have good administrative capacity at 
the village-level, government employees can conduct awareness meetings. 
• Training of trainers: Second, staff from the NGO (henceforth referred to as 
‘trainers’) meet at a central location (district headquarters of the SNA or NGO) 
where they are provided information about the program and trained on how to 
conduct village-level awareness meetings. Trainers are provided a specially 
designed pamphlet with information about RSBY. This is an important tool as it 
helps standardize the information shared by different trainers in various village-
level awareness meetings. 
• Announcements in the villages: Third, trainers inform village-level 
functionaries (such as members of the village government and frontline workers) 
in each village about the date, time and location of awareness meetings and 
request them to ask all households to attend the meeting with their RSBY smart 
cards. 
• Awareness meeting: Fourth, RSBY beneficiaries arrive at the meeting venue with 
their RSBY smart cards. Trainers distribute specially designed information 
pamphlets and read out the contents. They share examples of people in the 
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district who have benefitted from RSBY. The meeting concludes with a question 
and answers session. 
• Payment of trainer: Finally, trainers take photos of attendees with RSBY smart 
cards and information pamphlets as evidence of conducting the training and 
share them with the NGO. The NGO pays the trainer. 
 
5. Data and Methods 
To estimate the effectiveness of village-level awareness meetings in increasing RSBY 
utilization rates, we conducted an experiment in 61 villages of Chamarajanagara District 
in the state of Karnataka between December 2012 and February 2013. Chamarajanagara 
District provided an ideal setting for this experiment as 83 percent of its population 
lives in rural areas (Census of India 2011) and all RSBY hospitals in the district are in the 
four urban areas (towns). More importantly, the RSBY utilization rate for the first five 
months ranged between zero and 0.2 which is relatively lower than other districts in the 
state. 
We use administrative data from the RSBY Monitoring and Information System (MIS) 
to calculate the utilization rate for each village. The RSBY MIS provides information on 
each hospitalization claim made by each enrolled individual. The following formula 
measures the utilization rate of RSBY:  
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𝑈𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑌 𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑆𝐵𝑌 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑠
 ∗ 100 
According to Jain (2014), the all-India RSBY utilization rate for the first year of RSBY in 
345 of India’s 640 districts was 1.9 percent. This figure increased to 2.2 percent for 
districts completing the second year of RSBY by April 2012. In Karnataka, the average 
utilization rate for all 30 districts of the state in the first year of RSBY was 0.93 percent 
(Jain 2014). This provides a good benchmark for comparing results from this study as 
Chamarajanagara District was in the first year of RSBY implementation during this 
experiment. The policy period for the first year of RSBY in Chamarajanagara District 
started in April 2012 and ended in June 2013. 
This experiment estimates the impact of village-level awareness meetings on two 
groups of villages using a phase-in design. Village-level awareness meetings were 
conducted in 27 villages (henceforth referred to as ‘early treatment villages’) in the last 
week of December 2012 and the remaining 34 villages (henceforth referred to as ‘late 
treatment villages’) received the intervention in the third week of February 2013. Figure 
6 shows a map of Chamarajanagara District. Chamarajanagara District is divided into 
four administrative blocks. Each block has a block headquarters (a small town where 
sub-district government offices are located). All RSBY hospitals in Chamarajanagara 
District are in the block headquarters. 
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Each block is further divided into gram panchayats (GPs), which is a group of villages 
that have a common local government (on average, a GP has three villages in 
Chamarajanagara district). As all villages in a GP have the same local government, there 
is a constant movement of residents between these villages. We assign the intervention 
at the GP-level (as opposed to the village-level) to avoid the possibility of spillovers of 
information between villages in the same GP. Of the 34 GPs that received the 
intervention, half received the treatment in late December (early treatment villages) and 
the other half received the treatment in late February (late treatment villages). All 61 
villages (34 GPs) are in Chamarajanagara and Kollegala blocks of Chamarajanagara 
district. We selected these 61 villages as the NGO only works in these villages. 
Though the intervention was supposed to be randomly assigned, the NGO responsible 
for conducting village-level awareness meetings switched GPs between the two groups 
as some early treatment villages were very close to late treatment villages (raising 
concerns about possible spillovers). Table 8 provides a comparison of the two groups of 
villages on important social and RSBY-related indicators. Early treatment villages are 
larger (number of households) and located further away from RSBY hospitals (distance 
to nearest town serves as a good proxy for this measure). In terms of demographic 
characteristics, both groups have similar literacy rates and proportion of socially 
disadvantaged households (scheduled castes and tribes). RSBY enrollment rates are 
marginally higher in early treatment villages.  
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As the intervention was only implemented in Chamarajanagara and Kollegala blocks of 
Chamarajanagara District, we use villages from Gundlupet block as a control group for 
this analysis. Gundlupet block, unlike Yelandur block, is located away from the blocks 
that received the treatment which reduces the likelihood of possible spillovers of 
information from village-level awareness meetings. This increases the suitability of this 
block to be a potential control group for this analysis. Table 8 includes information 
about these control villages. While the control villages are a lot smaller in size compared 
to villages that received the intervention, they are similar in terms of the average 
distance to RSBY hospitals and the percentage of enrolled RSBY households. To better 
evaluate their suitability as possible control groups for this analysis, it is important to 
look at the trends in RSBY utilization before the interventions were implemented.  
Figure 7 shows the cumulative RSBY utilization rate for all three groups of villages from 
May 2012 to June 2013. The solid and dashed vertical lines indicate the beginning of 
village-level awareness meetings in the early and late treatment groups, respectively. 
Both early and late treatment villages see a sharp increase in RSBY utilization 
immediately after village-level awareness meetings. However, late treatment villages 
observe a small increase in utilization in October 2012 relative to early treatment and 
control villages. These two consecutive increases in late treatment villages are 
concentrated in one village where a group of RSBY beneficiaries visited an eye hospital 
to have cataract surgeries on the first weekend of October, followed by a second group 
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of RSBY beneficiaries who visited the same hospital for the same surgery the following 
weekend. A visit to the village after the completion of the experiment revealed that an 
eye hospital from a neighboring district (Mysore) sent their staff to this village to 
conduct an ‘eye camp.’ Eye camps are a common practice in rural areas in India. 
Hospitals identify patients in remote locations for cataract surgeries. Once identified, 
the hospitals provide transportation for these patients to travel to the hospital. In this 
case, once the first batch of RSBY beneficiaries returned to the village after their 
successful cataract surgeries, others in the village who needed cataract surgeries signed 
up to visit the hospital the following weekend (a case of demonstration effect).  
Figure 8 shows RSBY utilization rates for all three groups of villages for seven eight-
week phases starting in the middle of May. We use eight-week phases as our reference 
period because that is the gap between early and late treatment villages receiving the 
intervention. Neither group receives the intervention in the first four phases (14 May to 
25 December). The early and late treatment villages receive the intervention at the 
beginning of the fifth (starting 25 December) and sixth (starting 19 February) phases, 
respectively. In the seventh phase, both groups have received the intervention. The 
control group does not receive the intervention in any phase. 
Besides serving as a control group for early treatment villages in the fifth phase, late 
treatment villages also help assess their suitability as a control group (i.e. did the 
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treatment have a similar effect on late treatment villages in the sixth phase as it did on 
early treatment villages).  
Given the staggered implementation of the intervention, we use a generalized 
difference-in-differences model to estimate the treatment effect of village-level 
awareness meetings on the RSBY utilization rate. To use this approach, it is important to 
verify the parallel trends assumption (i.e. in the absence of treatment, the trends in the 
outcome variable would have remained the same for treatment and control groups). 
One way to check whether this assumption holds is to look at the trends before the 
awareness meetings are conducted. In Figure 8, the trends in RSBY utilization rates are 
very similar for early treatment and control villages. Though the trend for late 
treatment villages deviates from the other groups between the second and third phases, 
it is similar to the other groups in the preceding pre-treatment phases. This deviation 
results from the eye camp that was discussed earlier. 
As the parallel trend assumption holds and both treated groups of villages see a similar 
impact of treatment (in the fifth and sixth phase, respectively), we use a generalized 
differences-in-differences method to estimate the impact of village-level awareness 
meetings. The empirical model used to estimate the treatment effect in this study is the 
following: 
𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑝 =  𝛼0 +  𝛼1𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑝 +  𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑝 +  𝜀𝑖𝑝 
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where i denotes village; p denotes phase (time); 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑝 is the RSBY utilization rate for 
village i in phase p; 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑝 is a difference-in-differences estimator that takes the 
value 1 for every phase p during which village i receives the intervention and 0 
otherwise; 𝛾𝑖 is a village fixed effect; 𝜆𝑝 is a phase (time) fixed effect; and, 𝜀𝑖𝑝 is an 
idiosyncratic error term. We are interested in 𝛼1, the difference-in-differences estimator 
that measures the effect of village-level awareness meetings on RSBY utilization rates 
(treatment effect). 
 
6. Findings 
We present results in Table 9 for four different combinations of the three groups of 
villages: all villages; early and control villages; late and control villages; and early and 
late villages. All models include village and time (phase) fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the gram panchayat level. As some of our models have few clusters 
(GPs), we also present bootstrap p-values in brackets using the wild cluster bootstrap-t 
method. 
The treatment effect ranges from 0.22 to 0.29 and is statistically significant in all four 
models. This implies that the treatment increases the RSBY utilization rate by 
approximately 0.25 percentage points in the eight-week phase following the treatment. 
This is a significant increase in RSBY utilization when compared to the average annual 
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RSBY utilization rate of 0.93 percent for districts completing the first year of RSBY in 
Karnataka. To put it in monthly terms, the intervention increases the RSBY utilization 
rate by approximately 0.12 percentage points in a month while the average monthly 
utilization rate for all districts in Karnataka is 0.07 percent. 
These results are similar to a study by Das and Leino (2011) that used information 
pamphlets to increase enrollment in RSBY among low-income households in Delhi. 
While their intervention did not increase enrollment in households that received the 
pamphlet relative to those that did not, they did find that enrollment rates nearly 
doubled in a subset of households (both treated and control) that were visited by 
surveyors to collect information about household characteristics. Like the impact of 
village-level awareness meetings on RSBY utilization rates, a visit by a surveyor 
increased RSBY enrollment rates among low-income households. 
 
Internal Validity 
As the three groups of villages are non-equivalent, there is a likelihood of selection bias 
(i.e. the groups could be different in time-variant characteristics that are unobservable). 
While the NGO attributed the changes in the assignment of treatment among GPs to 
concerns about contamination (i.e. some early treatment villages were very close to late 
treatment villages, which could have resulted in spillovers of the intervention), other 
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factors could have determined this change as well. To address this concern, the study 
relies on two robustness checks for ensuring the internal validity of these results. First, 
the parallel trends assumption that ensures that all groups have similar pre-treatment 
trends in RSBY utilization rates. In this analysis, all groups of villages have similar 
trends in the first four phases (except for a temporary increase in the utilization rate of 
late treatment villages in one of the four pre-treatment phases). Second, the phase-in 
design of the experiment allows for a comparison between the impact of awareness 
meetings on early and late treatment villages. In this analysis, as seen in Figure 8, the 
treatment has similar impacts on both groups once they receive treatment. 
 
External Validity 
Though the intervention was designed to increase awareness about RSBY in low 
utilization areas in Karnataka, the results from this study can be generalized to other 
geographical contexts and social programs. Table 10 compares the socio-economic 
characteristics of Chamarajanagara district with Karnataka state and India. While 
Karnataka state has better socio-economic indicators than the national average, 
Chamarajanagara district has socio-economic indicators that are below the national 
average. The success of this intervention will primarily depend on two factors: first, the 
performance of the program (number of active hospitals and enrollment rate in the case 
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of RSBY) and second, the availability of trainers (presence of NGOs or government 
frontline workers). 
As governments adopt new technologies for improving the delivery of social programs, 
there will be more opportunities to monitor the performance of these programs. In the 
case of RSBY, the online data management system allows government agencies to 
identify areas with low utilization and target these areas with direct communication 
interventions. Similarly, other programs could also identify areas with low utilization 
and use similar IEC interventions to increase awareness and improve utilization of 
social programs. 
 
Positive Externality 
While the main objective of village-level awareness meetings was to disseminate 
information about the program, trainers reported an unintended outcome. Many 
individuals attended the meetings to share grievances related to the program. Three of 
the most common grievances were delays in the delivery of smart cards, refusal of 
treatment and overcharging by hospitals. The delays in delivery of smart cards, which 
was also reported by Rajashekhar et al. (2012), were caused by smart card service 
providers (SCSPs) not issuing smart cards ‘on-the-spot.’ To issue smart cards ‘on-the-
spot’, SCSPs had to carry printers and batteries to each village. Our interactions with 
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village functionaries revealed that many SCSPs would collect the required information 
(photos and biometrics) on their laptops in each village and print the cards in the 
nearest town. As the cards had to be activated by a government-appointed field key 
officer (FKO), the SCSPs would request the FKOs to come to the location where the 
cards were being printed and activate all the cards. The activated cards were then 
handed over to the FKOs. This resulted in delays as the FKOs were not always available 
to activate the cards or, once the cards were activated and handed over to the FKOs, 
they would delay the distribution of cards. This informal process adopted by the SCSPs 
to reduce costs left many enrolled beneficiaries without RSBY coverage and defeated 
the purpose of ‘on-the-spot’ enrollment. 
Other major grievances reported by beneficiaries were refusal of treatment and 
overcharging by RSBY hospitals. As RSBY had prescribed rates for each treatment, 
many hospitals were only accepting patients for treatments and procedures that were 
profitable for the hospital. During our interactions with doctors in RSBY hospitals, 
many complained about the low rates of RSBY treatment packages relative to market 
rates. This was a genuine concern as RSBY had a standard set of rates for the entire state 
and did not account for regional differences in costs of treatments. However, selectively 
refusing treatment to RSBY beneficiaries was a violation of program rules. Some RSBY 
beneficiaries also complained about being charged for treatment. Under RSBY, patients 
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are not supposed to make any payments as all costs are covered by the standard rate set 
by the health insurance program.  
Trainers documented these cases and shared them with the SNA. With a lack of 
administrative capacity to monitor the program in remote locations, the government 
agency started benefitting from these inputs as it allowed officials to hold the insurance 
companies accountable. The village-level awareness meetings not only increased 
awareness among RSBY beneficiaries but also served as an effective monitoring tool for 
the government. While increasing awareness is one way to improve the utilization of a 
public health insurance program, it is also important to address supply-side issues that 
contribute to low utilization. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The main objective of designing and evaluating an information, education and 
communication (IEC) intervention for government agencies responsible for managing 
RSBY (India’s national health insurance program) was to provide an effective and easy-
to-implement method for disseminating information about the program and increasing 
utilization of RSBY in low utilization areas. This study estimated the impact of village-
level awareness meetings and found that they increase RSBY utilization rate by 
approximately 0.25 percentage points in each eight-week period following the 
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intervention (or a monthly increase of approximately 0.12 percentage points). In 
comparison, the average annual RSBY utilization rate for districts completing the first 
year of RSBY in the state of Karnataka was 0.93 percent (or a monthly utilization rate of 
0.07 percent).  
Should government agencies use this IEC method to address low levels of utilization of 
public health insurance programs? Village-level awareness meetings are effective in 
ensuring that all beneficiaries attending the meeting get an opportunity to learn about 
the public health insurance program and get answers to their questions from a trained 
resource person. However, these meetings come at a cost that is relatively higher than 
other more conventional IEC methods such as information pamphlets and health 
camps. For example, the cost of printing IEC information pamphlets per village is 
approximately ₹200 ($2.7) while the cost of each village-level awareness meeting is 
₹1500 ($21). 
It is important to note that the main objective of designing this IEC method was to help 
state government agencies reach out to program beneficiaries in remote areas with low 
utilization rates. Hence, village-level awareness meetings are more effective as a 
targeted IEC method for areas where program utilization is very low. As governments 
adopt new technologies to deliver social programs, they will have access to more 
regular data on program utilization. This will allow governments to identify areas with 
low program utilization. Once identified, the government can hire an NGO or use 
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frontline workers to conduct village-level awareness meetings in these locations. Not 
only will this ensure dissemination of information but also allow government agencies 
to assess why utilization has been low in these villages. 
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8. Tables and Figures 
Table 8: Comparison of Sample Villages by Treatment Status 
Characteristic 
Early Treatment 
Villages 
Late Treatment 
Villages 
Control 
Villages 
Scheduled Caste (%) 33.4 (23.9) 29.2 (15.5) 20.4 (16.3) 
Scheduled Tribe (%) 11.3 (11.5) 11.1 (16.3) 10.7 (17.8) 
Literacy Rate (%) 51.9 (5.3) 53.4 (5.8) 53 (6.8) 
No. of Households 964 (614) 811 (657) 424 (342) 
Population of Village 4024 (2597) 3329 (2813) 1733 (1383) 
Distance to Nearest Town 
(in km) 
16.5 (8.1) 12.8 (6.5) 15.5 (7) 
Households Enrolled in 
RSBY (%) 24.3 (17.1) 20.1 (10.4) 18.9 (14.9) 
No. of Villages 27 34 91 
No. of GPs (Clusters) 17 17 28 
Note: The table presents means and standard deviations (in parenthesis). Figures are 
calculated using data from the Census of India (2011). RSBY households are 
calculated using RSBY administrative data from the RSBY MIS (for the policy period 
2012-13). 
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Figure 4: Process Flow Diagram of RSBY 
 
 
Figure 5: Flow of Information in RSBY 
 
 
105 
 
Figure 6: Chamarajanagara District 
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Figure 7: Cumulative RSBY Utilization (All Villages) 
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Figure 8: RSBY Utilization Rates (All Villages) 
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Table 9: Results 
Dependent Variable 
RSBY Utilization Rate 
All Villages 
Early Treatment 
and Control Villages 
Late Treatment 
and Control Villages 
Early and Late 
Treatment Villages 
Treatment Effect 
0.250*** 
(0.061) 
[0.000] 
0.276** 
(0.117) 
[0.000] 
0.218*** 
(0.054) 
[0.000] 
0.291*** 
(0.093) 
[0.000] 
N 1064 826 875 427 
R2 0.243 0.243 0.198 0.234 
Gram Panchayats (GPs) 63 45 45 34 
Note: Village and time (phase) fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors clustered at the Gram Panchayat (GP) 
level are reported in parentheses. Bootstrap p-values (999 replications) are reported in brackets. 
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.1 
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Table 10: Comparison of Chamarajanagara with Karnataka and India 
Characteristic India Karnataka Chamarajanagara 
Scheduled Caste (%) 18.4 20 26.2 
Scheduled Tribe (%) 10.4 9.2 11.4 
Literacy Rate Males (%) 82.6 81.2 63.3 
Literacy Rate Females (%) 61.5 63.8 58.8 
Women with 10 years of more of 
schooling (%) 
27.3 35.1 28.1 
Households with electricity (%) 83.2 97 93.4 
Households with toilets (%) 36.7 42.6 27.1 
Households with health 
insurance (%) 
28.9 31.8 24.6 
Children Fully Immunized (%) 61.3 64.8 59.5 
Source: Caste/Tribe data from Census of India (2011) and remaining figures from 
NFHS-4 (2015-16) Factsheets for India, Karnataka and Chamarajanagara. All figures 
for rural populations. 
 
110 
 
9. References 
Azam, Mehtabul. (2018). Does Social Health Insurance Reduce Financial Burden? Panel 
Data Evidence from India. World Development, Vol 102, 1-17.  
Berman, Peter, Rajiv Ahuja and Laveesh Bhandari. (2010). The impoverishing effect of 
healthcare payments in India: new methodology and findings. Economic & Political 
Weekly, 45(16), 65–71.  
Census of India. (2011). Primary Census Abstract for Chamarajanagara District. 
Government of India: Census of India. (Data accessed on April 15, 2020).  
Currie, Janet. (2006). “The Take-Up of Social Benefits.” In David Card Alan Auerbach 
and John Quigley (Eds.), Poverty, the Distribution of Income, and Public Policy (pp. 80–148). 
New York: Russell Sage.  
Das, Jishnu and Jessica Leino. (2011). Evaluating the RSBY: Lessons from an 
Experimental Information Campaign. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 46 (32).  
Fadlallah, Racha et al. (2018). Barriers and facilitators to implementation, update and 
sustainability of community-based health insurance schemes in low- and middle-
income countries: A systematic review. International Journal for Equity in Health, 17 (13). 
Fertig, Angela, Caroline Carlin, Scott Ode and Sharon Long. (2018). Evidence of Pent-
Up Demand for Care after Medicaid Expansion. Medical Care Research and Review, Vol 75 
(4), 516-524.  
111 
 
Hou, Xiaohui and Robert Palacios. (2011). Hospitalization Patterns in RSBY: Preliminary 
Evidence from the MIS. India’s Health Insurance Scheme for the Poor: Evidence from the 
Early Experience of the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, 117-152. New Delhi, India: Centre 
for Policy Research.  
Jain, Nishant. (2014). Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana: A Step towards Universal 
Health Coverage in India. India Infrastructure Report 2013-14 (Chapter 10).  
Johnson, Doug and Kumar, Sushil. (2011). Do Health Camps Make People Healthier? 
Evidence from an RCT of Health Camps on Usage of RSBY.  
La Forgia, Jerry and Somil Nagpal. (2012). Government-Sponsored Health Insurance in 
India: Are You Covered? Washington DC: The World Bank.  
Platteau, Jean-Phillippe and Ontiveros, Darwin Ugarte. (2013). Understanding and 
Information Failures: Lessons from a Health Micro insurance Program in India. 
Research Paper No. 29. Micro insurance Innovation Facility. International Labor 
Organization. Geneva  
Prinja S, Chauhan AS, Karan A, Kaur G, Kumar R. (2017). Impact of Publicly Financed 
Health Insurance Schemes on Healthcare Utilization and Financial Risk Protection in 
India: A Systematic Review. PLOS ONE 12(2)  
112 
 
Rajashekhar, D, Erlend Berg, Maitreesh Ghatak, R Manjula and Sanchari Roy. (2011). 
Implementing Health Insurance: The Rollout of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana in 
Karnataka. Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 46 (20).  
Ravi, Shamika, Rahul Ahluwalia and Sofi Bergkvist. (2016). Health and Morbidity in 
India (2004-2014). Brookings India Research Paper. December.  
Sengupta, Reshmi and Debasis Rooj. (2019). The Effect of Health Insurance on 
Hospitalization: Identification of Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard and the Vulnerable 
Population in the Indian Healthcare Market. World Development, Vol. 122 (110-129).   
Shoree, Shantanu, Rupalee Rushismita and Kinnary R. Desai. (2014). Evaluation of 
RSBY’s Key Performance Indicators: A Biennial Study. Research Paper No: 42. 
International Labour Office (ILO), Geneva.  
Swarup, Anil and Nishant Jain. (2010). Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana, India. 
Successful Social Protection Floor Experience: Sharing Innovative Experiences, 18, 259-70. 
ISSN 1728-4171. Geneva: United Nations Development Program, Global South-South 
Development Academy, International Labor Organization.  
Sun, Changqing. (2011). An Analysis of RSBY Enrolment Patterns: Preliminary 
Evidence and Lessons from the Early Experiences. India’s Health Insurance Scheme for the 
Poor: Evidence from the Early Experience of the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana. Center for 
Policy Research, New Delhi. 
113 
 
Thakur, Harshad. (2016). Study of Awareness, Enrollment and Utilization of Rashtriya 
Swasthiya Bima Yojana in Maharashtra, India. Frontiers in Public Health, Vol 3.  
World Bank. (2011). Social Protection for a Changing India, Vol. 2. Washington DC: 
World Bank.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 
 
Conclusion 
In this dissertation, I examine the implementation and impact of demand-side health 
policies in rural India. I focus on conditional cash transfers (CCT) and public health 
insurance programs, two types of demand-side health policies that have become 
popular at the national level in India over the past two decades. The proliferation of 
demand-side health policies at the federal and state levels marks an important shift in 
Indian healthcare policy which traditionally relied on predominantly supply-side health 
interventions that focused on public provisioning of healthcare (such as the 
construction of healthcare facilities and deployment of healthcare workers).  
In the first and second chapters of this dissertation, I focus on the impact and 
implementation of CCT programs aimed at improving maternal and child health. I 
examine the rollout of a national CCT program to promote health-seeking behaviors 
among pregnant women before and after their deliveries. I use a border discontinuity 
design to estimate the causal effect of this maternal and child health CCT program and 
do not find large significant effects of this program on health-seeking behaviors. I 
further examine these results by conducting qualitative interviews with administrators 
and beneficiaries of this CCT program. I identify three reasons that explain the 
program’s limited effectiveness in increasing health-seeking behaviors in rural areas: 
high administrative burdens faced by beneficiaries while accessing the program, the 
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role of street-level bureaucrats (childcare workers) who are overworked and underpaid, 
and the limited administrative capacity at the sub-district level.   
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I shift focus on the impact and implementation 
of public health insurance programs. In 2008, the government introduced a national 
health insurance program that covered in-patient care for households living below the 
national poverty line. Along with my coauthor Changqing Sun, I design and test an 
information, education and communication (IEC) method to increase awareness among 
rural populations on how to avail benefits under this program. We find that directly 
communicating with beneficiaries of the program in rural areas increases the utilization 
of public health insurance programs as it helps reduce the learning costs associated 
with the complex program design. We also find that conducting village-level awareness 
meetings provide an ideal opportunity for government agencies to identify issues in 
program implementation. 
The main policy implication from my analysis is that ‘one-size-fits-all’ national health 
programs are unsuccessful in accounting for the varying levels of social, economic and 
administrative development in low-income rural areas. Standardized eligibility criteria, 
benefit amounts and delivery methods fail to address the regional variations in the 
availability of healthcare services, average household income and a lack of basic 
infrastructure such as internet connectivity and banking services, respectively. This 
defeats the objective of reducing the gap in socio-economic indicators between higher 
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and lower developed regions as it benefits the former more than the latter. As 
governments introduce new programs that use modern technologies such as biometric 
authentication, smart cards and online bank payments, there is a need to ensure a level 
playing field for these technologies to be successful in areas where they are being 
deployed. More importantly, as highlighted in the third chapter of this dissertation, 
there is a need to inform and prepare communities on how to use these new 
technologies and avail benefits under policies such as CCT and health insurance 
programs. 
Research on demand-side health policies has focused primarily on the impact of 
programs such as CCT and public health insurance on the utilization of healthcare 
services and their impact on health outcomes. There has been limited research on the 
implementation of these policies in developing countries to identify ways to improve 
their effectiveness. Public administration scholars can play an important role in filling 
this gap in the literature by focusing on program design and implementation. As I 
discovered during my research on maternal and child health CCT programs in India, 
the government-funded National Family Health Survey did not include questions about 
the national conditional maternity benefits programs rolled out in 2011 and 2017 in the 
fourth (2015-16) and fifth (2018-19) rounds of the survey, respectively. This limited the 
ability of researchers to estimate important implementation metrics such as coverage of 
the program. Public administration scholars can address this gap by conducting 
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qualitative studies while also advocating for the inclusion of more information about 
implementation in national health surveys. 
As more demand-side health policies are implemented in developing countries, there is 
an urgent need to ensure these policies are designed for effective last-mile delivery of 
benefits. This will only be possible if governments ensure there are sufficient healthcare 
services, adequate administrative capacity, motivated street-level bureaucrats and basic 
infrastructure such as banking services and internet connectivity. To conclude, demand-
side health policies cannot be an effective solution to addressing low utilization of 
healthcare services without resolving supply-side constraints such as limited 
availability of healthcare services and inadequate administrative capacity. 
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